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This dissertation consists of three chapters studying different issues related to self-
employment and entrepreneurship.  The first chapter studies the effects of labor market 
frictions and credit constraints in an economy with self-employment. Two types of self-
employed workers emerge in the model: (i) entrepreneurs and (ii) workers using self-
employment as a stopgap. I show that labor market frictions generate a motive not to 
transition into self-employment, by making self-employment a choice that takes time to 
reverse. At the aggregate level, these frictions also reduce the average size of 
entrepreneurs' businesses. Meanwhile, even if credit constraints are of particular 
importance for entrepreneurs, they also affect the stopgap self-employed. When credit 
constraints are tighter, fewer vacancies are posted, which increases the number of 
workers using self-employment as a stopgap in equilibrium. 
In the second chapter, I use data from the PSID to study the characteristics of workers 
using self-employment as a stopgap while searching for another job, vis-à-vis those of 
other self-employed workers. The data reveals that stopgap self-employment is relatively 
high among young workers and those who experienced unemployment. Furthermore, the 
probability of entering self-employment increases monotonically with wealth for those 
not using self-employment as a stopgap, while it has an inverted U shape for those using 
self-employment as a stopgap. I also find that being unemployed increases the probability 
of becoming stopgap self-employed, but has no effect on the probability of becoming 
self-employed for other reasons. 
The third chapter examines the impact of exogenous technological growth on 
entrepreneurship and unemployment. The model developed in that chapter predicts that in 
the absence of labor market frictions, technological growth has an effect on 
entrepreneurship if and only if it affects an entrepreneur's capacity to manage workers. 
When labor market frictions are present, technological growth may have a positive or 
negative impact on entrepreneurship and unemployment. The desirable outcome of an 
increase in the rate of technological growth enhancing entrepreneurship and dampening 
unemployment is more likely to be obtained when the interest rate does not increase 
significantly with growth, technological change is disembodied, and growth enhances 
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Chapter 1: Self-Employment, Labor Market Frictions and Credit 
Constraints 
1. Introduction 
    This dissertation chapter studies the effects of labor market frictions and credit 
constraints in a general equilibrium setting where self-employment is one of the possible 
economic activities. Allowing for self-employment in a general equilibrium model is 
important for several reasons. First, a non-trivial fraction of workers in the U.S. economy 
are self-employed. According to estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau, over 14 million 
workers were self-employed in 2008, accounting for about 10% of total employment. 
Second, a large fraction of the U.S. net wealth is in the hands of self-employed workers. 
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) estimate that self-
employed workers in US economy (11.1% of their sample) hold about 39% of the U.S. 
economy's total net worth. Self-employed business owners (7.6% of their sample) 
account for 33% of the total wealth. For these and other reasons, it is important to 
understand how the behavior of self-employed workers is affected by the economic 
environment they operate in. 
    This dissertation chapter focuses on the effects of credit constraints and labor market 
frictions on the behavior of self-employed workers as well as on the aggregate 
implications of these frictions. The reason for focusing on these two frictions is that the 
empirical literature has often highlighted them as having important effects on the 
behavior of both the self-employed and the self-employed-to-be. With respect to credit 
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frictions, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) report that 18% of self-employed business owners 
report having been turned down for credit and 29% of them use their own personal assets 
as collateral to finance their business. Several studies have also showed that credit 
constraints affect workers' decisions to become entrepreneurs.1 With respect to labor 
market conditions, Evans and Leighton (1989) find that being unemployed increases the 
probability of becoming self-employed, while Blanchflower and Oswald (1991) find that 
higher regional unemployment rates also increase the probability of entering self-
employment. 
    The emphasis given in the empirical literature to the effects of credit and labor market 
frictions on self-employment suggests that there are two types of self-employment. For 
some workers self-employment is an entrepreneurial activity. For others, self-
employment is a stopgap. By introducing labor market frictions, the model developed in 
this dissertation chapter can generate both entrepreneurial and stopgap self-employment, 
which allows one to study how labor market frictions and credit constraints affect each 
type of self-employed worker. The model can also explain some of the observed 
differences in behavior between entrepreneurs and workers using self-employment as a 
stopgap documented in Rasteletti (2009b). These differences include: 1) workers using 
self-employment as a stopgap have very short self-employment spells; while 60% of new 
stopgap self-employed end their self-employment within the first year, only 23% of new 
entrepreneurs do so. 2) After controlling for workers' characteristics, labor income is 
lower for stopgap self-employed workers. Rasteletti (2009b) also finds that workers' 
                                                 
1 Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find 
evidence of a positive correlation between wealth and entry into self-employment. More recently, Hurst 
and Lusardi (2004) find this positive relation is present only among the very rich. 
3 
 
wealth and individual labor market histories play an important role in explaining 
differences in the probabilities of workers transitioning into self-employment. While 
having more wealth increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur, it reduces the 
probability of becoming self-employed as a stopgap. Rasteletti (2009b) also finds that 
being unemployed increases the probability of becoming stopgap self-employed, while 
having no significant effect on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. 
    This dissertation chapter relates to the theoretical literature studying the effects of 
borrowing constraints on entrepreneurs.2 The papers in this literature do not include labor 
market frictions, which leaves them unable to study workers using self-employment as a 
stopgap or the effects of borrowing constraints on this group of workers. These models 
are also unable to study how labor market frictions affect the behavior of entrepreneurs. 
My work on this chapter also relates to the literature studying the effect of labor market 
frictions on workers' behavior. This chapter differs from most of these models by 
allowing workers to become self-employed and search for a job while self-employed.3 By 
combining self-employment, credit constraints and labor market frictions, the model 
developed in this dissertation chapter can answer several questions that have not been 
addressed by either literature. Some of these questions are: How do labor market frictions 
affect workers' decision to transition into and out of self-employment in the presence of 
credit constraints? Does the interaction of labor market frictions and credit constraints on 
                                                 
2 The most widely cited papers in this literature are Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Quadrini (2000) and 
Buera (2006). 
3 To my knowledge, there has been only one paper (Rissman, 2003) studying the effect of labor market 
frictions on self-employed workers' behavior. She examines a partial equilibrium model based on 
Mortensen (1970), where workers' only decision is whether to search for a job while unemployed or self-
employed. Her model is relevant to studying transitions into self-employment by poor workers, but it is not 
suited for studying interactions between labor market frictions, credit constraints and self-employment 
given that workers cannot accumulate assets in her model. 
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entrepreneurs generate changes in workers' saving behavior? If so, what are the effects on 
capital supply and interest rates? And do these interactions have important aggregate 
implications? 
    The model developed in this dissertation chapter unveils some rich interactions 
between labor market frictions, credit constraints and self-employment that have 
implications not only for worker's decision rules but also for some key economic 
aggregates. One important effect of these interactions is on the decision rule for 
transitions into self-employment. Labor market frictions generate a motive not to 
transition into self-employment, which I call fear of failure. In the presence of labor 
market frictions, the worker realizes that if his business fails in the future, he will have to 
spend time searching for a job, which implies a cost in forgone income. Forward looking 
workers take this future cost into account at the time of making their decision on whether 
to become an entrepreneur. As found in other theoretical papers, the presence of credit 
constraints generates policy rules for transitions into entrepreneurship that are 
characterized by a wealth threshold property. That is, workers become entrepreneurs only 
if their financial wealth is high enough. The fear of failure motive increases the levels of 
these wealth thresholds, which might lead to a reduction in the proportion of 
entrepreneurs in the economy if labor market frictions are severe enough. 
    Two general equilibrium findings are worth highlighting. First, tighter credit 
constraints on entrepreneurs increase the proportion of workers using self-employment as 
a stopgap and the duration of their self-employment spells. When credit constraints on 
entrepreneurs are tightened, the entrepreneur's lower access to credit results in a reduction 
of both the output of their businesses and their income levels. Entrepreneurs then decide 
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to cut their savings and accumulate less wealth. As a consequence, the equilibrium 
aggregate wealth is lower and the interest rate is higher. This increase in the interest rate 
reduces the profits of firms in the corporate sector, who now decide to post fewer 
vacancies. Having fewer vacancies makes exiting self-employment more difficult and 
leads to an increase in the proportion of workers using self-employment as a stopgap and 
an increase in the duration of the self-employment spell. 
    The other important general equilibrium finding is that more severe labor market 
frictions both increase the relative size of the self-employed sector and reduce the 
average productivity of self-employed businesses. The average productivity decreases for 
two reasons. First, more workers use self-employment as a stopgap. In general, these 
workers are less productive than entrepreneurs, so the increase in their number reduces 
the average productivity of self-employed workers. Second, average productivity of the 
businesses of entrepreneurs also decreases. This decrease is mainly due to a lower access 
to credit by entrepreneurs, which originates from their lower capital holdings. 
Entrepreneurs hold lower levels of wealth because more severe labor market frictions 
reduce the equilibrium interest rate. This reduction in the interest rate originates both 
from a shift to the right of the supply of capital (workers save more out of precaution) 
and from a shift to the left of the demand for capital (the lower number of firm-worker 
matches reduces the demand for capital). The main (dominant) effect is the capital 
demand from firms, which reduces the interest rate and saving. This is offset somewhat 
by the increased precautionary saving of workers, which increases saving and further 
reduces interest rates. Overall, the reduction in saving is driven by the dominant effect of 
lower capital demand. The lower wealth holdings in steady state result in workers 
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entering entrepreneurship with lower levels of wealth. This reduces their access to credit 
and therefore the average productivity of new entrepreneurs. The lower interest rate also 
leads existing entrepreneurs to save less, and therefore the businesses of entrepreneurs 
grow at a slower rate. The lower initial productivity of new entrepreneurs and the lower 
growth rate of existing entrepreneurs explains the decrease in the entrepreneurs' 
productivity. 
    The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I develop a general 
equilibrium model that is used to analyze the effects of credit constraints and labor 
market frictions on worker behavior as well as the aggregate implications of these 
frictions. The model is a directed search model in which workers have a career choice to 
make, face labor market frictions if they decide to search for a job at a firm, and also face 
credit constraints if self-employed. In section 3, I analyze some of the implications of the 
model and characterize certain features of the equilibrium. In section 4, I calibrate the 
model to study numerically the effects of labor market frictions and credit constraints on 
worker behavior and on some key aggregates. Conclusions are presented in section 5. 
2. Model 
    In this section, I develop a two sector general equilibrium model to study the effects of 
labor market frictions and credit constraints in an economy where self-employment is one 
of the possible economic activities. The economy consists of a continuum of workers, 
with measure one, and a continuum of potential corporations, with measure m>>1. 
Production in the economy takes place either in the corporate sector or in the non-
corporate sector, with the non-corporate sector being comprised of the businesses of the 
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self-employed workers. Firms in the different sectors differ both in the technology used 
for production as well as in their access to the capital market. While corporations have 
perfect access to the capital market, self-employed workers only have partial access. 
Workers and firms in the corporate sector come together via search. Firms willing to hire 
a worker need to post a vacancy and workers that decide to search for a job have to apply 
to one of the vacancies posted by firms. This search process is similar to that in 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). The problems faced by workers and firms in the corporate 
sector are described below. 
2.1. Workers’ Problem 
    Agents make choices in order to maximize their expected discounted value of lifetime 
utility 
1                                                          	
	, 	∞	  
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, a no-borrowing constraint, a wealth 
allocation constraint, a job search technology and a production technology. All these 
constraints are specified below. In expression (1), E₀ is the expectation operator as of 
time 0,  β is the time discount factor, ct and lt represent worker's consumption and hours 
worked at time t, and u(⋅) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function for 
all positive levels of consumption. If 	  0, 
	, 	  ∞. The utility function also 
satisfies the Inada Conditions, that islim ,  ∞, and lim ,  0. 
Workers can either work full time (	  1) or not work at all (	  0). Leisure increases 
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utility, which implies that 
	, 0  
	, 1 for all 	  0. 
    The decisions workers need to make at any point in time depend on whether they are 
currently working for a firm in the corporate sector or not. I name the former matched 
workers, and the latter unmatched workers. Unmatched workers need to search for a job 
in order to become matched. Matched workers can become unmatched either 
endogenously by deciding to quit their job, or through exogenous separation. Besides 
being matched to a firm or unmatched, workers can possess a business project or not. I 
use the variable !	 to capture whether the agent has a business project (!	  1) or not 
(!	  0). I assume that the arrival of a business project is a stochastic process. Losses of 
business projects can happen stochastically or can be a consequence of agents' decisions. 
Endogenous losses of business projects happen when an unmatched worker with a 
business project decides to accept a job at a firm, or when a self-employed worker with a 
business project decides not to work. 
2.1.1. Unmatched Workers 
    Workers that are unmatched in a given period have to decide whether to be self-
employed and whether to search for a job at a firm in the corporate sector. If an 
unmatched worker is not self-employed, he has no labor income in the current period, but 
he enjoys leisure time. If a worker decides to be self-employed in the current period, he 
has positive labor income, but he does not enjoy leisure. In what follows, I label 
unmatched workers who are not self-employed but who search for a job as 
"unemployed", while unmatched workers who are not self-employed and who do not 
search are labeled "not in the labor force". Workers who are self-employed may search 
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for a job at a firm. I label workers who are self-employed and not searching for a job 
"entrepreneurs" and those workers who are self-employed and searching for a job 
"stopgap self-employed". 
    If an unmatched worker decides to search for a job at a firm, he also needs to decide 
which of the posted vacancies to target. Vacancies differ only on wages paid, and wages 
remain constant for the whole duration of the worker-firm match. Applying to a vacancy 
has no cost for workers, but requires a commitment to accept the job and work for the 
firm for at least one period, in case the job is offered to them. For this reason, workers 
can only apply to one vacancy at a time. I name ω ∈ Ωt the particular vacancy the agent 
targets, where Ωt is the set of all vacancies posted at time t, which is public information. 
    Given the existence of a continuum of workers, workers cannot coordinate their 
applications to vacancies and at a point in time several workers can apply to the same 
vacancy. Firms cannot differentiate among workers and choose randomly among 
applicants when they get more than one. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the worker 
will be able to get his target job. The probability of getting the job depends on the number 
of applicants to that same vacancy. I name the number of workers applying to a given 
vacancy queue length, and represent it as %& ∈ '0, ∞(. The probability of getting a 
particular job is then a function of its queue. I call this probability *'%&(. Workers do 
not know queue lengths before applying to a vacancy and therefore need to form 
expectations about them. I call these expectations %+&. Given that %& is unknown, 
the probability of getting particular jobs is also unknown to workers. 
    If an unmatched worker decides to be self-employed in the current period, he has 
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access to a production technology that is captured in a production function ,-	, !	 
where -	  is the amount of physical capital used in production. Capital depreciates at a 
rate . per period. The amount of output a self-employed worker can produce also 
depends on whether the agent has a business project or not. For self-employed workers 
without a business project (!	  0), output is independent of physical capital. That is, 
,-	, 0  /  0. For self-employed agents with a business project (!	  1), output is a 
strictly increasing function of -	. Self-employed workers with a business project can 
produce at least as much as self-employed workers without a business project, that is 
,-	, 1 0 ,-	, 0  /. Furthermore, this inequality is strict provided that -	  0. 
Finally, the production function is strictly increasing and strictly concave in capital, with 
lim1 21,31  ∞ and lim1 21,31  0. 
    Self-employed workers also need to decide how much physical capital to use in their 
businesses. They can either use their own capital for production or they can borrow it in 
the financial market at a price r per period. Self-employed workers face a constraint on 
how much capital they can borrow, with the amount that can be borrowed being 
proportional to the worker's financial wealth. Workers can also lend all or part of their 
wealth in the financial market at the real interest rate r. 
    Finally, all unmatched workers decide how much to consume and how much to save in 
every period. Given consumption and production decisions, financial wealth evolves as 
follows: 4	53   ,-	, !	  6 7 .-	 7 1 7 64	  	.4 I also assume that workers 
                                                 
4 Note that for all unmatched workers without a business project the optimal kt=0. This implies 
that for self-employed workers without a business project financial wealth evolution is given by  
at+1=(1+r)[at-ct]+b, and for those workers unemployed or out of the labor force, financial wealth 
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must hold non-negative wealth at every point in time. That is, 4	 0 0, for all t. 
    The timing of events and decisions made during the period is as follows: at the 
beginning of the period the agent receives a business project shock. Given all previous 
information and the realization of the business project, the unmatched worker has to 
decide whether to be self-employed and whether to apply for a job at a firm or not. If he 
decides to apply for a job, he has to decide which vacancy to target. Next, the worker 
decides how much to consume and, if self-employed, how much to produce. At the end of 
the period, if the agent is matched to a job, he becomes a worker. If not, he remains 
unmatched. Figure 1.1 below summarizes the timing of events. 
FIGURE 1.1: Unmatched Worker’s Problem. 
 
Given the timing of events and the assumptions made above, the value of being an 
                                                                                                                                                 
evolution is given by at+1=(1+r)[at-ct]. 
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unmatched worker 84	, !	 equals the maximum of the value of being out of the labor 
force 9:;4	, !	, the value of being unemployed 9;4	, !	, the value of being self-
employed and searching for a job <;4	, !	and the value of being self-employed and not 
searching for a job <:;4	, !	. That is to say, 
 
2                      84	, !	  >4?@9;4	!	, 9:;4	!	, <;4	!	, <:;4	!	A 
    The value of being out of the labor force is the solution to the following functional 
equation 
3                              9:;4	, !	  max E
	, 0 7 	'84	53, !	53(F 
subject to 
    4	53  1 7 6'4	  	( 
    4	 0 0 
The value of being unemployed is the solution to the following functional equation 
4                  9;4	, !	  max,HIJK ∈Ω M
	, 0 7 1  *'%+&(	'84	53, !	53(7*'%+&(	'NO	53, 4	53, 0( P 
subject to the same constraints as in (3). NO	53, 4	53, 0 is the value of being matched 
to a firm and being paid a wage O	53. One important feature to notice in my definition of 
the value function for 9;⋅ is that the value of being matched to a firm is 
NO	53, 4	53, 0 and not NO	53, 4	53, !	53. This comes from my assumption that 
unemployed and self-employed agents lose their business projects when they accept a job 
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at a firm. 
    Similarly, the value of being self-employed and searching for a job is the solution to 
the following functional equation: 
5             <;4	, !	  max,1,HIJK ∈Ω M
	, 1 7 1  *'%+&(	'84	53, !	53(7*'%+&(	'NO	53, 4	53, 0( P 
    subject to 
4	53   ,-	, !	  6 7 .-	 7 1 7 64	  	 
-	  R4	 
4	53  0 0 
where R 0 1 is a parameter capturing how much self-employed workers with a business 
project can borrow to rent physical capital.5  
The value of being self-employed and not searching for a job is the solution to the 
functional equation 
6                           <:;@4	,!	A  max,1 E
	, 1 7 	'84	53, !	53(F 
subject to the same constraints as in (5). 
Given the value functions described above, an unmatched worker's optimal decision on 
whether to be out of the labor force, unemployed, stopgap self-employed, or an 
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! ^\ 84	, !	  9:;4	, !	.  Y! 
_!>`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Za!T ^\ 84	, !	  <;4	, !	.Y! 4_ !_[6!`6!_!
6 ^\ 8@4	,!	A  <:;4	, !	.              
c 
                                                 
5 The constraint -	  R4	 is consistent with self-employed workers having to put up collateral in 
order to be able to borrow. While solving the model numerically in section 4, the benchmark 
value of λ is 1.44. I also analyze an extreme case where workers cannot borrow at all (λ =1) and a 




The policy functions for consumption, capital utilization and wage targeting are given by 
d4, !, -d4, !, Od4, ! respectively, and are implied by the solutions to the value 
function that maximizes equation (2).6  
2.1.2. Matched Workers 
     Workers that are matched to a firm cannot search on the job. Under this assumption, a 
matched worker has only two decisions. After observing his business project shock, a 
matched worker decides whether to quit in order to enter self-employment, 
unemployment or being out of the labor force. After this decision is made, a matched 
worker decides how much to consume. At the end of the period, workers and firms can be 
exogenously separated. Exogenous separations occur with probability s each period. The 
timing of events and decisions faced by matched workers is summarized in figure 1.2 
below. 
The value function for a matched worker who does not quit can be written as follows: 
7     NO, 4	, !	  max M
	, 1 7 1  b	>4?'NO, 4	53, !	53, 84	53, !	53(7b	'84	53, !	53( P  
   subject to 
    4	53  1 7 6'4	  	( 7 O 
    4	53 0 0 
                                                 
6 If the maximum value in equation (2) corresponds to the value of being a self-employed worker 
not looking for a job, or to the value of being out of the labor force, O84, !   f. Similarly, if 
the worker optimally chooses unemployment or not being in the labor force, -84, !  0. 
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FIGURE 1.2: Matched Worker’s Problem. 
    
 The policy function for consumption for a matched worker that decides not to quit is 
represented by gO, 4, !. His optimal decision on whether to remain matched to the 
firm or quit is given by 
TgO	, 4	, !	  M h!>4^_ >4[]!T ^\ NO	, 4	, !	  84	, !	.  i
^[, Z[]!6O^b!.                                                             c 
    Having described the problems faced by matched and unmatched workers, I now 
describe the problem faced by firms in the corporate sector. 
2.2.  Corporations’ Problem 
    Firms in the corporate sector can either be matched to a worker or unmatched. If a firm 
is unmatched and wants to produce, it must first hire a worker. To be able to hire a 
worker, unmatched firms need to post a vacancy, which has a cost c. Vacancies are 
posted with a wage, which the firm commits to pay for the duration of the match. Due to 
labor market frictions, there is no guarantee that posting a vacancy will result in the 
hiring of a worker. The probability of filling the vacancy depends on the number of 
applicants the vacancy attracts, that is, on the queue length %&. The probability of 
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filling a vacancy is given by j'%&(. I further assume that j0  0, j ∞  1 and 
k⋅lm  0. Firms do not know ex-ante the length of the queue their vacancies will 
generate, so they form expectations about queues. 
    Once a firm finds a worker, it has access to a production technology \-	, where -	 is 
the physical capital used in production. Firms can rent capital at a rental price per period 
of r, which is determined in equilibrium. The firm's production technology is increasing 
and concave in physical capital and satisfies Inada conditions. 
    The value of an unmatched firm, JU, can be written as 
8           od  max p0,  7 11 7 6 maxH Ej'%+&(ogO 7 1  j'%+&(odFq 
where ogO is the value of a newly matched firm paying a wage O. 
    Matched firms decide how much physical capital to rent each period and remain 
matched until the worker quits or the match is exogenously terminated. The value of a 
newly matched firm paying a wage w is 
9                              ogw   p 11 7 6q	

	 tu	OvO  @1  u	OAodw 
where vO  max1x E\-y  O  6 7 .-yF is the maximized per period profit of an 
active firm, and u	O is the probability that a match formed with wage O will still be 
alive after t periods. In turn,  u	O z 1  b	{3@| &+4t∏ @1  ~+4A	3 wT4A 
where &+4 represents the firm's beliefs on the distribution of applicants' wealth at the 
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time matched are formed and  ~+4 captures the probability that a previously 
unmatched worker with initial assets a₀ will quit the match after j periods.7  ~+· is a 
function of the saving behavior of matched workers; the probability of getting a favorable 
business project shock; and the decision rule of matched households mapping current 
assets and business project state into the decision to quit or not quit. 
    Finally, I assume that there is free entry of firms. Firms enter the market until the point 
where no firm has an incentive to enter. That is, od  0. 
    In what remains of this dissertation chapter, I limit my analysis to stationary rational 
expectations equilibria. This implies two things: first, the distribution of unmatched 
workers over asset holdings and business project shocks and the distribution of matched 
workers over asset holdings, wages and business project shocks are time invariant. I refer 
to these two distributions as d4, ! and gO, 4, !, respectively. Secondly, agents' 
and firms' beliefs about queue lengths as well as firms' expectations of employment 
durations and wealth distribution of applicants are correct in equilibrium. To assure 
trembling hand perfection, I also require that beliefs about queue lengths and 
employment duration are correct along out-of-equilibrium paths. 
2.3. Equilibrium  
2.3.1. Definition of Equilibrium 
    A stationary rational expectations equilibrium consists of a set of value functions od, 
                                                 
7 Note that since et is reset to zero when self-employed or unemployed workers take a job at a 




ogO , 84, ! and NO, 4, !; a set of decision rules Od4, !, -d4, !, d4, !, 
Td4, !, gO, 4, !, TgO, 4, ! and -yO; a set of wage offers Ω, queues %&, an 
interest rate r, and a set of distribution functions d4, ! and gO, 4, !, such that: 
    1. od  0 (free entry condition). 
    2. All wage offers in Ω solve the Bellman equation (8) given ogO, od, c and r 
(optimal posting). 
    3. -yO  46,>4?E fk  w  r 7 δkF. 
    4. ogO and  -yO  satisfy the Bellman equation (9) given u	O and od. 
    5. The decision rules Od4, !, -d4, !, d4, !, Td4, !, TgO, 4, ! and the value 
functions  84, !, 9;4, !, 9:;4, !, <;4, !, <:;4, ! and NO, 4, ! solve the 
Bellman equations (2) through (7). 
    6. %+&  %&, &+4₀    &4₀ and ~+?  ~ ?  (rational expectations). 
    7. d4, ! and gO, 4, ! are the time-invariant distributions resulting from optimal 
behavior. 
    8. | | 4 d4, !T4T! 7 | | | 4 gO, 4, !TOT4T!  
 -yO| | | gO, 4, !TOT4T! 7 | | -d 4, 1 d4, 1T4   (capital market 
clearing). 




2.3.2.  Existence Of Equilibrium 
In order to show the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium I introduce some 
important lemmas. First, the assumptions of directed search and rational expectations 
allow me to derive the following: 
 
LEMMA l: All vacancies paying a given wage w have the same queue length in 
equilibrium. The higher the wage posted, the higher the queue attracted in equilibrium. 
PROOF: The opposite cannot be true. If two jobs with the same wage offer had different 
queue lengths in equilibrium, agents would redirect their search toward the job with the 
shorter queue, increasing their probability of getting the job. Similarly, if two jobs had 
the same queue but one had a higher wage, agents would redirect their search towards the 
job with the higher wage, since the probabilities of getting the job are identical. 
 
This lemma allows us to replace q(ω) with q(w). From now on I will refer to the firm as 
posting vacancies or wages interchangeably. 
     
LEMMA 2: Given Dt(w), all posted wages O ∈ Ω satisfy 
10                     j'%O(vO  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	O  1 7 6  0 
PROOF: Substituting the free entry condition JU=0 into the Bellman equations (8) and (9) 
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and using rational expectations I find that 
ogO  1 7 6j'%O( 
 
ogO  vO  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	O 
Combining these two equations one gets equation (10). 
 
      This lemma is important because it states that in equilibrium, queue lengths to 
different wages are determined endogenously as a function of the market interest rate and 
firm's expectations on match durations. 
 
LEMMA 3: The value functions 8⋅ and N⋅ exist and are continuously increasing in 4 
and !. N⋅ is strictly increasing in O. 
PROOF: See appendix. 
 
LEMMA 4: A stationary rational expectations equilibrium always exists.  
PROOF: See appendix. 




3. Characterization Of Optimal Behavior 
3.1. Transitions Into Self-Employment 
    Depending on parameter values, two different types of entry into self-employment can 
occur in equilibrium. These differ on whether the newly self-employed worker searches 
for a job at a firm while self-employed or not. I define entrepreneurial entry into self-
employment as entry by workers who do not search for a job at a firm while self-
employed, and stopgap entry as that by workers who search for a job at a firm while self-
employed. 
    Workers entering self-employment with an entrepreneurial motive have different 
characteristics than those entering with a stopgap motive. Under certain parameter values, 
entrepreneurial entry is only observed among workers who have a business project. 
Furthermore, in the case of matched workers with a business project, entrepreneurial 
entry is observed only among relatively rich workers.8 More specifically, there exists a 
threshold level of assets 4HO, 1 such that a matched worker with a business project 
decides to quit his job and becomes self-employed only if 4  4HO, 1.9 This result 
hinges upon the credit constraint assumption. Self-employed agents with low assets are 
forced to operate their business at an inefficiently low scale, causing income while self-
employed with a business project to be too low compared to wages paid by firms. For this 
                                                 
8 This statement is not true if the disutility from working is too high and/or the productivity of self-
employed workers with a business project is relatively low. If the disutility from working is too high, only 
poor workers work. Rich workers choose to be out of the labor force. If the productivity of the self-
employed worker with a business project is relatively low, all entries into self-employment are stopgap 
entries. 
9 I am unable to make this statement in a form of a lemma because the matched and unmatched workers' 
value functions are not differentiable everywhere. Given that lim NO	 , 4	 , 1  lim 84	 , 1 and 
given that both 84	 , 1 and NO	 , 4	 , 1 are continuous functions, if d,3  H,,3  are uniquely 
defined over a relevant range, there exists a threshold level of assets 4HO, 1 such that the matched 
worker decides to become self-employed only if 4   4HO, 1. This result is observed in the numerical 
simulations of the model. 
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reason, matched workers with low assets decide to stay at the firm even if they have a 
business project. Self-employed workers with higher assets can operate their businesses 
at a more efficient level, which increases their business income and makes self-
employment more attractive. 
    Stopgap entry into self-employment is observed among poor unmatched workers.10 
This result hinges upon the credit constraint and the assumption that lim 
	, 	 
∞, which guarantees that lim <;4	, !	  lim 9;4	, !	   ∞. In the case 
of unmatched workers without a business project, given that both 9;4	, !	 and 
<;4	, !	 are continuous functions, if  :,+  ;,+  in a relevant range,11 
(assuming these derivatives are uniquely defined over the relevant range), there exists a 
threshold level of assets 40 such that an unmatched worker without a business project 
decides to become stopgap self-employed if and only if 4  40, and searches for a job 
while unemployed otherwise. Under certain parameter values, stopgap self-employment 
can also be observed among poor unmatched workers with a business project. Given the 
presence of borrowing constraints, sufficiently poor self-employed workers with a 
business project have a relatively low labor income compared to the wages offered by 
firms. For these workers to have a higher self-employment income in the future, an 
increase in own wealth is required, which requires low levels of current consumption. If 
consumption has to be relatively low for several periods in order for labor income while 
self-employed to reach the level of wages paid by corporations, poor workers might find 
it optimal to search for a job at a firm, even if they have a business project. There exists 
                                                 
10 This statement is true only if the disutility from working is high enough. If the disutility from working is 
low enough, even a relatively rich unmatched worker will use self-employment as a stopgap rather than 
searching while unemployed. 
11 This property holds in numerical simulations for low asset levels. 
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then a wealth threshold 41 such that an unmatched worker with a business project 
decides to use self-employment as a stopgap if and only if 4  41, and enters self-
employment as an entrepreneur (i.e. does not search for a job at a firm) otherwise.12 
    Besides generating stopgap self-employment, labor market frictions also discourage 
matched workers with a business project from becoming entrepreneurs. In the presence of 
labor market frictions, the worker realizes that if his business fails in the future, he will 
have to spend time searching for a job, which implies a cost in forgone income. Forward 
looking workers realize this future cost, taking it into account at the time of making their 
decision on whether to transition into self-employment. The fact that workers who search 
for a job obtain their target job with probability less than one reduces the value of being 
an unmatched worker searching for a job at a firm. This effect can lead some matched 
workers not to enter self-employment in the first place. I call this reason not to enter self-
employment fear of failure.13 I choose this name because, if workers voluntarily select 
themselves into self-employment, the option to search for a job at a firm only has a 
positive shadow value when the self-employed worker loses his business project. This 
fear of failure also translates into higher wealth thresholds for transitioning into 
entrepreneurship, as workers insure themselves against the probability of becoming 
stopgap self-employed. 
 
3.2. Transitions Out of Self-Employment 
    Three types of transitions out of self-employment can occur: exit from the labor force, 
                                                 
12 For this to happen it has to be the case that over a relevant range 
;,3  ;K,3   (where uniquely 
defined). This property holds in numerical simulations for low asset levels. 
13 A mathematical discussion of the fear of failure is presented in the appendix. 
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transition to unemployment and transition into jobs at a firm in the corporate sector. Exits 
from the labor force are observed among very rich agents. For these workers leisure 
yields a higher utility than the extra income from working full time, either at their 
business or at a firm. Transitions into unemployment happen if <;4	, !	  9;4	, !	 
and 9;4	, !	   9:;4	, !	. This type of transition out of self-employment is observed 
among relatively rich agents who lose their business project. 
    To understand transitions into jobs at a firm in the corporate sector by self-employed 
workers one needs to analyze first whether a self-employed worker searches for a job at a 
firm, and then, if he does, which wage does he target. The wage application decision is 
important because the probability of getting a job, and therefore the probability of 
transitioning out of self-employment, depends on the chosen wage. With respect to 
whether self-employed workers apply to a job, their decision is made by comparing the 
value of searching and not searching. If the income of self-employed workers without a 
business project is low enough compared to the wages offered by firms in equilibrium, 
this group will always search. For self-employed workers with business projects, the 
decision on whether to search might depend on their asset holdings, given the existence 
of credit constraints that prevent some self-employed workers from operating their 
businesses at an efficient scale.14 
    With respect to optimal wage application, given that in the model jobs differ only in 
the wages paid, a worker would prefer having a high wage job. However, high paying 
                                                 
14 It is important to note that the wealth threshold below which a self-employed worker with a business 
project decides to search for a job is not given by the level of assets that makes labor income of the self-
employed worker equal to wU(at,et). Workers might not look for a job, even if their labor income as self-
employed is lower than wU(at,et). The reason is that there is an option value of remaining self-employed, 
given the assumption that a worker with a business project loses his project if he transitions into 
employment at a firm. This option value is higher, the harder it is to come across business projects and the 




jobs are harder to get in equilibrium. Therefore, applying to a high wage job is more risky 
than applying to a low wage job in the sense that a high wage job is less likely to be 
obtained. How much risk a worker will be willing to take when applying for a job 
depends on his wealth and on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
     
LEMMA 5: If the utility function presents decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA),  
H,+  0. For increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA), H,+  0. Finally, 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) implies 
H,+  0. 
 
    The impact of wealth on wage application decisions is of particular importance 
because it is the basis on which firms form expectations of employment duration. For 
DARA or IARA, given the realization of the worker's business project shock, there is a 
one-to-one relation between asset holdings and wage applications. This is not true for 
CARA given that the wage application does not depend on wealth. In this case, firms' 
expected employment duration is given by the population average employment duration 
over subgroups of workers with a business project and without a business project. 
    The model also has predictions on how unmatched workers searching for a job change 
their wage application decision as their search duration increases. For these workers 
being unmatched is a relatively bad option. If they are impatient enough, their asset 
holdings decrease. Lower assets lead agents to apply for lower wages assuming DARA 
utility. This behavior generates a positive relation between search duration and the 
probability of finding a job. 
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3.3. Wealth Accumulation 
    Studying workers' saving decision is important not only because asset holdings play an 
important role in the decisions to become and remain self-employed, but also because the 
economy's behavior in general equilibrium depends crucially on the equilibrium interest 
rate, which is a function of the wealth distribution. 
    There are five forces that influence workers' decision on how much to save. The first 
three forces are present in most models with a saving decision while the last two forces 
are specific to dynamic career choice models with a constraint on borrowing. The first 
force is related to a permanent income motive for saving, with agents saving more in 
periods when labor income is high. The second force is related to a precautionary motive 
for saving. If the agent's utility function has a positive third derivative, workers save in 
order to afford higher levels of consumption in case they become exogenously separated 
or lose their business project. The third force is impatience. Workers have incentives to 
reduce or increase their asset holding over time depending on whether the discount factor 
β is smaller or greater than (1+r)⁻¹. 
    The fourth force, only present among constrained self-employed workers with a 
business project, is a higher return on savings. While for all other workers the return on 
savings is given by the interest rate, for constrained self-employed workers with a 
business project the return on saving is given by the marginal product of physical capital, 
which is higher than the market interest rate. 
    The last force is related to the possibility of becoming self-employed in the future. 
Agents working for a firm who get a business project will not enter self-employment 
immediately if their assets are low. Instead, they remain at a firm until they have saved 
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enough to start their business at a sufficiently big scale. This behavior implies a loss in 
lifetime income, so workers save in order to reduce the time spent out of self-
employment when having a business project. 
    Given all the different forces affecting savings, interactions among these forces 
emerge. One of the more important interactions is between the permanent income motive 
and the return on savings. Constrained self-employed agents with a business project have 
a relatively high marginal product of capital, which leads them to save more. If the 
wealth of the self-employed worker with a business project is relatively high, his labor 
income is also relatively high compared to the wages paid by corporations. The 
permanent income motive then creates further incentives to increase savings. For these 
two reasons credit constrained self-employed agents tend to have very high saving rates. 
 
3.4.  General Equilibrium Implications 
    The equilibrium interest rate, which is affected by the wealth distribution, is an 
important indicator of the properties of the equilibrium because it affects the behavior of 
both matched and unmatched workers as well as the behavior of firms in the corporate 
sector. First, interest rates affect the size of corporate firms as well as the size of the 
businesses owned by self-employed workers with a business project. In the case of firms 
in the corporate sector, the optimal capital demand equates the marginal product of 
capital to the rental price. The lower the interest rate, the more capital is rented by firms 
and the more output is produced. In the case of self-employed workers with a business 
project, a lower interest rate reduces the return to lending compared to the return to 
investing in their own businesses, which leads self-employed workers to increase the 
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optimal size of their businesses. 
    Interest rates also affect the number of corporations that decide to enter the market, 
which has implications for the set of wages that are offered in equilibrium and the queue 
lengths associated with different wages. To see these effects more clearly, recall that 
wages offered in equilibrium have to satisfy the following equation: 
 j'%O(vO  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	O  1 7 6  0 
    If the interest rate decreases, c(1+r) decreases and, for any given wage w, π(w) 
increases. For the equation above to be satisfied, j'%O( and/or  335	 u	O need to 
decrease in equilibrium. If u	O is relatively insensitive to the interest rate15, the queue 
associated with the wage w needs to decrease in equilibrium. For queue lengths to 
decrease, more firms need to enter the market, which causes workers applying to a wage 
O to be spread over more firms in equilibrium. Given this reduction in queue lengths, 
jobs paying a wage w become easier to get. On the other hand, this effect implies that 
vacancies posting a wage w become more difficult to fill. Therefore, a lower interest rate 
results in risk being shifted from workers to firms, which is efficient given that firms are 
risk neutral and workers are risk averse. 
    This reduction in the risk of applying to a certain wage has two additional effects. 
First, it encourages workers to apply to higher wages, which affects the set of wages 
offered in equilibrium. In particular, both the lowest and highest wages offered are now 
higher. Second, as argued above, one of the reasons matched workers might not become 
self-employed is the fear of failure, resulting from the fact that it takes time for 
                                                 
15 In the numerical simulation of the model we find that expected match durations in equilibrium are largely 
insensitive to the interest rate. 
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unsuccessful self-employed workers to find a job at a firm. Given that jobs become easier 
to get when the interest rate is lower, the fear of failure motive becomes weaker when the 
interest rate decreases. This increases incentives for matched workers with a business 
project to enter self-employment. 
     
4. Numerical Solution 
4.1. Calibration 
    To better understand how labor market frictions and credit constraints affect workers' 
behavior and the general equilibrium, the model is solved numerically in this section. To 
do this, one needs to choose the duration of the time period, the functional forms of the 
utility function, the production function and the matching function, as well as other 
parameters of the model. Most parameter values used are either obtained from previous 
empirical studies or are values commonly used in previous literature. Parameters that 
cannot be chosen in this fashion are calibrated to match certain moments of the U.S. data. 
    To account for the short duration of some observed unemployment and self-
employment spells, the duration of the time period is one month. The worker's utility 
function is assumed separable in consumption and leisure and has the following form: 

	, 	  	3{1    u	 
Remember that the worker either works full-time or does not work, so lt must be either 0 
or 1. 
    The production functions for corporations and self-employed businesses are: 
%	  -	 
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%	+  / 7 !	Y-	 
respectively. Note that for a self-employed worker without a business project et=0 and the 
production function is independent of the physical capital stock. 
    For the probability of a firm finding a worker I use the urn-ball matching function 
j'%O(  1  !?`%O 
I choose this functional form because it emerges in the limit as the number of workers 
applying to a wage w and the number of vacancies posting that wage approach infinity, 
keeping q(w) fixed. This function assumes that workers looking for a job with wage w 
apply to all vacancies posting that wage with the same probability, without coordinating 
their applications. When only coordination frictions are present, γ is always one. Having 
a value of γ smaller than one allows me to introduce extra matching frictions into the 
model. 
    Having specified the functional forms for the utility, production and matching 
functions, there are fifteen parameters to be chosen: two parameters related to the utility 
function (σ and D), a discount factor (β), five parameters related to the production 
functions (A, α, b, B, µ), one parameter in the matching function (γ), one parameter for 
exogenous separations (s), one parameter for the cost of posting a vacancy (c), one 
parameter for the depreciation rate (δ), one parameter for the borrowing constraint (λ) and 
two parameters for the transition matrix for the business project shock. I call the 
probability of getting a business project shock prget and the probability of losing a 
business project prlose. 
    The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ used is 1.5. This is a value in the range 
commonly used in numerical simulations of similar models. It is also the value used by 
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Cagetti and De Nardi (2005), and is close to that estimated by Attanasio et al. (1999). The 
discount factor β  is set at 0.994, which implies an annual discount of 0.95, a value 
commonly used in numerical simulations of similar models. 
    Both the cost of posting a vacancy (c) and A, a parameter describing the state of 
technology for firms in the corporate sector, are normalized to 1. The parameter α, which 
captures the income share in the corporate sector that goes to capital, is set to 1/3, a value 
commonly used in the literature and consistent with findings by Gollin (2002). The 
depreciation rate for capital is set to 0.66%. This value corresponds to a yearly 
depreciation rate of 7%, which is consistent with the depreciation of machinery estimated 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003). The probability of exogenous separation s is 
set to 2.6% per period, as estimated by Davis et al. (2008). Finally, the parameter 
capturing the credit constraint on entrepreneurs, λ, is set at 1.44 to match the estimate of 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989). 
    The remaining seven parameters (D, b, B,  µ, γ, prget and prlose) are calibrated to match 
some moments in the data. The selected moments to match are calculated from a sample 
of workers in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) used in Rasteletti (2009b), 
that merges data from the years 1989 and 1994. The two parameters capturing the 
probability of workers obtaining and losing their business projects (prget and prlose) are 
selected to match the proportion of entrepreneurs in the data and the average duration of 
an entrepreneur's business in the data. In the PSID sample, 7.28% of all workers in the 
labor force are entrepreneurs and the average duration of an entrepreneur's business is 
4.72 years.16 The parameter γ, which captures the severity of labor market frictions, is 
                                                 
16 Identifying entrepreneurs in the data is not a simple task. Most empirical studies define entrepreneurs 
either as business owners or as self-employed workers. Given that both empirical definitions of 
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calibrated so that the median duration of an unemployment spell is two months. This is 
the median unemployment duration in the PSID sample. 
    The labor income of a self-employed worker without a business project using self-
employment as a stopgap, b, is calibrated so that in equilibrium the ratio of the mean 
labor income of workers using self-employment as a stopgap to the mean labor income of 
matched workers equals the same ratio in the data. In the PSID sample used in Rasteletti 
(2009b) this ratio is 0.65. The parameter D, which captures the disutility from working, is 
calibrated to match the proportion of workers in stopgap self-employment. Rasteletti 
(2009b) finds that approximately 2.27% all workers in the labor force use self-
employment as a stopgap. Finally, the remaining parameters (B and µ) are calibrated to 
match the proportion of unemployed workers in the economy (6.11%) and the ratio of the 
average wealth of entrepreneurs to the average wealth of matched workers (6.21).  
    Table 1.1 summarizes the parameters used in the numerical solution of the model while 
Table 1.2 shows the moments generated by the model vis-a-vis the data moments 
targeted.    The rest of this section is organized as follows: I first do a partial equilibrium 
analysis of how workers' decisions change when facing different labor market frictions 
and different borrowing constraints. While doing this I keep the interest rate and the 
queues associated with the different wages posted by firms fixed. Next, I look at the 
general equilibrium implications of labor market frictions and borrowing constraints. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
entrepreneurship have problems (not all business owners or self-employed workers are entrepreneurs), 
some studies prefer to define entrepreneurs as self-employed business owners. This is the definition used in 
Rasteletti (2009) and in this paper to identify entrepreneurs. All other self-employed workers are treated as 
being in the stopgap group. 
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TABLE 1.1: Parameter Values 
Fixed Parameters Calibrated Parameters 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
β 0.994 D 0.25 
σ 1.5 b 2.5217 
c 1 B 0.18 
A 1 µ 0.70 
α 1/3 γ 0.60 
δ 0.0066 prget 0.0014 
s 0.026 prlose 0.0177 
λ 1.44   
 
4.2. Workers' Decision Rules 
    To analyze the effects of credit constraints and labor market frictions on workers' 
behavior, I fix the interest rate at 3.2%,17 and assume that the queues associated with 
wages are those implied by equation (10), assuming that firms believe that workers 
remain matched until they get a business project or are separated exogenously. We do 
this in order to identify how labor market frictions and credit constrains affect workers' 
behavior, without confounding these impacts with the effects of changes in the interest 
rate or in the wage offer distribution. To better understand the effect of labor market 
frictions, in this section I sometimes refer to the behavior of workers in a special case 
with no labor market frictions. In this special case workers always get the job they apply 
                                                 
17 This is the interest rate that emerges in equilibrium in the benchmark calibration. 
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to and firms always fill their vacancies in equilibrium. This case is explained in more 
detail in appendix I.4. 
 
TABLE 1.2: Data and Model Moments 
 MODEL DATA 
LABOR FORCE (L.F.) COMPOSTION  
Proportion of Entrepreneurs in L.F.               7.28 7.28 
Proportion of Stopgap Self-Employed in L.F.   2.30 2.37 
Proportion of Unemployed in L.F.                 6.37 6.11 
DURATIONS 
Mean Duration Entrepreneurs                        4.72 yrs 4.72 yrs 
Duration Unemployment (Median)                 2 mo. 2 mo. 
LABOR INCOME (L.I.) 




Ratio Mean Wealth Entrepreneurs to Mean Wealth 
Matched Workers                    
6.44 6.21 
     
        Transitions into self-employment can happen among workers with or without a 
business project. In my simulations, transitions into self-employment by workers without 
a business project only happen in equilibrium among relatively poor unmatched 
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workers.18 Relatively rich unmatched workers without a business project choose to search 
while unemployed, in order to enjoy leisure. The wealth thresholds below which an 
unmatched worker without a business project prefers self-employment to unemployment 
depend on the extent of labor market frictions and on the severity of credit constraints 
faced by self-employed workers. A summary of the different thresholds for different 
combinations of labor market frictions and credit constraints is presented in Table 1.3. 
 
 TABLE 1.3: Transitions into Self-Employment by Unmatched Workers without 
Business Project: Wealth Thresholds. 
Credit Cons. 







None Never Never Never 




















Note: Numbers in parenthesis normalize the wealth thresholds by the maximum annual 
labor income if matched. Workers below the wealth threshold use self-employment as a 
stopgap. γ =x implies that the job finding rate cannot be higher than x. 
     
                                                 
18 Out of equilibrium, transitions into self-employment can also happen among matched workers without a 
business project currently receiving a wage below a certain wage threshold. This finding depends critically 
on my assumption that matched workers are not allowed to search for a job. Matched workers without a 
business project receiving a low wage  find it optimal to separate from firms to become self-employed and 
search for a job paying a higher wage. I do not observe this type of transition in equilibrium, given that 
workers always apply to wages above the threshold for this type of endogenous separation. 
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    Several results are worth highlighting. First, when labor market frictions are not 
present, unmatched workers without a business project never transition to self-
employment. If workers are exogenously separated from their jobs they immediately start 
working for another firm in the corporate sector, given the low labor income if they 
become self-employed without a business project. Therefore, stopgap self-employment 
cannot be present unless labor market frictions are present. Secondly, the wealth 
threshold below which an unmatched worker without a business project transitions into 
self-employment is higher, the more severe the labor market frictions. Thirdly, the wealth 
threshold below which an unmatched worker without a business project transitions into 
self-employment is higher, the more restrictive the borrowing constraints on the self-
employed. These last two effects are a consequence of a permanent income effect. For 
unmatched workers without a business project, permanent income is higher when labor 
market frictions are lower and borrowing constraints are less restrictive.19 Given this 
higher permanent income, unmatched workers without a business project find it optimal 
to consume leisure at some levels of assets for which they would choose stopgap self-
employment under stricter labor market or borrowing frictions. 
    With respect to transitions into self-employment by workers with business projects, 
credit constraints generate wealth thresholds below which a matched worker with a 
business project does not transition into self-employment. This is because the labor 
income while self-employed is lower than the wage obtained at the firm if the worker's 
wealth is low, since low wealth forces entrepreneurs to operate at an inefficiently small 
                                                 
19 Note that relaxing borrowing constraints does not immediately benefit stopgap entrepreneurs without a 
business project. For these workers current self-employment income equals b, and therefore is independent 
of physical capital. Their permanent income is higher because their future labor income is higher when they 
do get a business project. 
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scale. Unlike credit constraints, labor market frictions alone do not deter entry by self-
employed workers with a business project, unless they are very strong. However, mild 
labor market frictions do increase the wealth thresholds when there are credit constraints 
on the self-employed. This result stems from the worker's fear of losing the business 
project and remaining unmatched for several time periods, which I refer to as the fear of 
failure effect. The thresholds for entry for different combinations of credit constraints and 
labor market frictions are shown in table 1.4 below. 
 









None > 12.34 (0.27 yrs) > 15.39 (0.33 yrs) > 23.04 (0.49 yrs) 
Benchmark (γ=0.60) > 12.51 (0.27 yrs) > 15.70 (0.34 yrs) > 23.60 (0.51 yrs) 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) > 12.79 (0.27 yrs) > 16.05 (0.35 yrs) > 24.11 (0.52 yrs) 
High (γ =0.15) > 13.27 (0.28 yrs) > 16.97 (0.36 yrs) > 24.70 (0.53 yrs) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis normalize the wealth thresholds by the maximum annual 
labor income if matched. γ =x implies that the job finding rate cannot be higher that x. 
     
Several findings are worth highlighting. Firstly, in the absence of labor market frictions 
and borrowing constraints, all workers in the labor force that get a business project decide 
to become self-employed, and those without a business project decide to work for a firm 
in the corporate sector, as long as their wealth is below the leisure threshold. Otherwise 
they choose to be out of the labor force. Secondly, the entry threshold for matched 
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workers with a business project is highly sensitive to the extent of credit constraints. In 
the benchmark case with γ=0.60, the wealth threshold for transitioning into self-
employment is increased by 50.32% when λ changes from 1.44 to 1. This is because λ=1 
forces new self-employed workers to finance all capital used for production out of own 
financial wealth. Therefore, when λ =1, matched workers with a business project require 
a higher level of wealth to enter self-employment, in order not to experience a drop in 
labor income upon entry. 
    Thirdly, when labor market frictions are initially at a low level the wealth thresholds 
for entry into self-employment are not highly sensitive to small changes in the extent of 
labor market frictions. Changes in the extent of labor market frictions have a much bigger 
effect on the wealth threshold for transitioning into entrepreneurship when they are at a 
higher initial level. In the benchmark case when γ =0.60 and λ=1.44, the wealth threshold 
for matched workers with a business project to transition into self-employment only 
increases by 2.29% when γ is reduced by half to 0.30. When labor market frictions are 
further reduced by half to 0.15, the wealth threshold now increases by 5.73%, about two 
and a half times higher than the previous value. This reflects the increase in the fear of 
failure motive. When γ =0.60, it takes about two months on average for a worker to find a 
job given their optimal wage application. Given this short search spell and the fact that 
self-employed workers have a positive labor income while searching, the fear of failure 
motive is relatively very weak and the effect of labor market frictions on the wealth 
threshold for transitioning into self-employment is very small. When γ =0.15, it takes a 
about eight months on average for a worker to find a job given their optimal wage 
application. The fear for failure motive is now more important, generating a higher 
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increase in the wealth threshold for transitions into self-employment.20  
    Three types of transitions out of self-employment occur in the current calibration of the 
model. First, self-employed workers with very high wealth, with or without a business 
project, exit the labor force to enjoy leisure. Second, relatively rich self-employed 
workers leave self-employment to search for a job while unemployed after losing their 
business project. Third, transitions out of self-employment directly into employment at 
firms occur among self-employed workers who choose to search for a job at a firm. In my 
simulations, I find that in equilibrium all self-employed workers without a business 
project search for a job while those with a business project do not. 
 
4.3. General Equilibrium Results 
4.3.1. Implications of Credit Constraints on Entrepreneurs 
    For relatively mild labor market frictions, changes in the tightness of credit constraints 
do not affect the proportion of entrepreneurs in the economy. This result is due to the fact 
that in equilibrium all workers have asset holdings that are higher than the wealth 
thresholds for entry into self-employment by workers with a business project. Therefore, 
whenever a worker working for corporation gets a business project, he quits his job to 
become an entrepreneur. For this reason, the proportion of entrepreneurs in the economy 
is insensitive to the tightness of credit constraints. 
    Even if credit constraints do not prevent workers from becoming entrepreneurs, they 
do prevent the majority of entrepreneurs from running their business at an efficient scale. 
                                                 
20 Remember that here we are only doing a partial equilibrium analysis, keeping the interest rate and the 
wage offer distribution fixed. In general equilibrium, the increase in the labor market frictions leads to a 
lower interest rate and higher wages offered. These higher wages increase the opportunity cost of not 




Table 1.8 below shows that the average output of entrepreneurs is highly sensitive to the 
extent of credit constraints. Compared to the benchmark case with γ=0.60 and λ=1.44, the 
average output of a self-employed worker is 29.22% lower when entrepreneurs have no 
access to credit (λ =1). 
    Interestingly, table 1.5 shows that tighter credit constraints on entrepreneurs increase 
the proportion of workers using self-employment as a stopgap, even though credit 
constraints do not affect this group of self-employed workers directly. This result 
emerges from two effects. First, when studying the effect of credit constraints on the 
decision of unmatched workers to be unemployed or to use self-employment as a 
stopgap, we observed in the previous section that the wealth threshold below which 
workers decide to use self-employment as a stopgap is increased when credit constraints 
are tightened due to a permanent income effect. All else equal, this increase in thresholds 
tends to increase the proportion of workers using self-employment as a stopgap. The 
second effect comes from changes in the behavior of firms both in the corporate and non-
corporate sector. When credit constraints on entrepreneurs are tightened, self-employed 
workers produce less and accumulate lower levels of wealth, which reduces aggregate 
wealth (see Table 1.6). As a consequence of lower aggregate wealth the equilibrium 
interest rate increases, which reduces profits of firms in the corporate sector. This 
reduction of profits results in fewer vacancies being posted at all wage levels and reduces 
the exit rate from stopgap self-employment, which leads to an increase in the proportion 
of workers using self-employment as a stopgap. 













None 0 0 0 
Benchmark (γ=0.60) 2.24 2.30 2.48 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 6.03 6.22 6.67 
High (γ =0.15) 12.99 13.40 13.99 
Note: γ =x implies that the job finding rate cannot be higher that x. 
   









None 235.1648 204.1200 174.4622 
Benchmark (γ=0.60) 213.6409 194.6207 173.7297 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 207.6407 189.0099 167.8621 
High (γ =0.15) 199.6007 178.4287 157.7756 
Note: γ =x implies that the job finding rate cannot be higher that x. 
     
    The higher aggregate wealth and lower interest rate in equilibrium when credit 
constraints on entrepreneurs are relaxed have some important implications for other key 
aggregates, in particular wage offers and aggregate output. With respect to wages, a 
lower interest rate increases wages offered by corporations and increases the probability 
of a workers getting a job at any given wage, due to the increase in vacancies posted by 
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firms at a given wage. When interest rates are lower, workers searching for a job apply to 
higher wages given the reduction in the associated risk, which results in workers having 
higher wages in equilibrium (see table 1.7). 
 










Benchmark (γ=0.60) 3.12 3.18 3.42 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 2.98 3.05 3.29 
High (γ =0.15) 2.62 2.74 3.05 
Wages 
Benchmark (γ=0.60) 3.8553 3.8464 3.8094 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 3.8778 3.8670 3.8286 
High (γ =0.15) 3.9423 3.9207 3.8671 
Note: γ =x implies that the job finding rate cannot be higher that x. 
     
    With respect to the effect of labor market frictions on output, the decrease in the 
equilibrium interest rate resulting from more severe labor market frictions leads firms in 
the corporate sector to rent more capital for production, which increases output per firm 














Benchmark (γ=0.60) 6.7383 6.4317 6.0504 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 6.6251 6.3114 5.9022 
High (γ =0.15) 6.4377 6.0961 5.6952 
Proportion of Total Output Produced by Corporations 
Benchmark (γ=0.60)  71.89 76.24 81.76 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 70.00 74.29 79.63 
High (γ =0.15) 66.46 70.65 75.90 
Average Corporate Output  
Benchmark (γ=0.60)  5.8490 
  
5.8351 5.7765 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 5.8870 5.8680 5.8074 
High (γ =0.15) 5.9827 5.9495 5.8683 
Average Self-Employed Output 
Benchmark (γ=0.60) 25.2331 20.1908 14.2913 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 25.2085 20.1238 14.1941 
High (γ =0.15) 25.1492 19.9326 14.0129 
Note: γ =x implies that the job finding rate cannot be higher that x. 
 
This increase in the productivity of firms in the corporate sector combined with the 
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increase in productivity of self-employed workers leads to an increase in aggregate output 
when credit constraints are relaxed. In the case γ =0.60, going from a situation where 
entrepreneurs are not allowed to borrow (λ =1) to one where λ =1.44 increases aggregate 
output by 6.3%. Interestingly, this increase in aggregate output happens despite a 
decrease in the fraction of workers employed due to the larger proportion of wealthier 
workers who choose leisure over employment (see Table 1.9). 
 









None 89.43 91.04 93.42 
Benchmark (γ=0.60) 93.28 94.43 95.99 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 93.73 94.81 96.10 
High (γ =0.15) 94.15 95.29 97.29 
Note: γ =x implies that the job finding rate cannot be higher that x. 
 
One of the main differences between the quantitative results in this chapter and the ones 
in Cagetti and DiNardi (2006) is that more severe borrowing constraints do not affect the 
number of entrepreneurs in the economy in my model, while they reduce the number of 
entrepreneurs in Cagetti and DeNardi’s baseline calibration.21 This difference is mainly 
due to the fact that they do a better job at matching the wealth distribution. In my 
                                                 
21 I only compare my results t Cagetti and DeNardi (2006) because their model and motivation are 
relatively similar to mine. The main difference of their paper with mine, besides the fact that their model 
does not include labor market frictions, is the way credit constraints are modelled. While in my model 
credit constraints are exogenous, in their model the borrowing constraints are endogenously determined. 
They originate from an assumption of imperfect enforceability of contracts. 
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calibration, all workers have asset holdings that are higher than the wealth thresholds for 
entry into self-employment by workers with a business project. Therefore, the proportion 
of entrepreneurs in the economy is insensitive to the severity of the borrowing 
constraints. Besides this difference, most other qualitative results are similar. We both 
find that more severe borrowing constraints reduce the average firm output, the aggregate 
capital stock and the interest rate in equilibrium. Quantitative results are difficult to 
compare due the differences in model assumptions and calibration.     
 
4.3.2.  Implications of Labor Market Frictions 
    Changes in the severity of labor market frictions do not affect the proportion of 
entrepreneurs in the economy. This result is due to the fact that in equilibrium all workers 
have asset holdings that are higher than the wealth thresholds for entry into self-
employment by workers with a business project. Therefore, whenever a worker working 
for corporation get a business project, he quits his job to become an entrepreneur. For this 
reason, the proportion of entrepreneurs in the economy is insensitive to the severity of 
labor market frictions. Labor market frictions have a much bigger impact on the 
proportion of workers using self-employment as a stopgap. Table 1.5 shows that starting 
from the benchmark case with γ =0.60 and λ =1.44, reducing γ to 0.30 increases the 
proportion of workers using self-employment as a stopgap from 2.30% to 6.22%. The 
proportion of unemployed workers also increases, as do the durations of unemployment 
and stopgap self-employment spells (see Table 1.10). 
    I find that more severe labor market frictions lead to a decrease in both the interest rate 
and the aggregate wealth (see table 1.6 and 1.7). The interest rate decreases both because 
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the supply of capital shifts to the right due to workers saving more out of precaution, and 
because the lower number of firm-worker matches shifts the demand for capital to the 
left. With respect to aggregate wealth, there are two opposing forces at work. On the one 
hand, the fact that labor market frictions are more severe creates incentives to save more 
out of precaution. On the other hand, the reduction in the demand for capital reduces 
interest rates, which reduces workers incentive to save. I find that the latter effect 
dominates, leading to a reduction in the aggregate wealth in the economy. The lower 
interest rate also generates higher wage offers and more vacancies being posted, which 
partially offsets the impact of higher unemployment risk introduced by the stronger labor 
market frictions. 
 










Benchmark (γ=0.60) 7.66 6.22 4.60 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 7.92 6.59 5.11 
High (γ =0.15) 8.21 6.93 5.07 
Average Search Duration  
Benchmark (γ=0.60) 2.25 months 2.26 months 2.30 months 
Intermediate (γ =0.30) 4.42 months 4.47 months 4.55 months 
High (γ =0.15) 8.83 months 8.87 months 8.94 months 




    As one might expect, when labor market frictions become more severe, aggregate 
output decreases. Changes in labor market frictions also have some interesting 
implications both for the composition of aggregate output as well as for the productivity 
of firms in the corporate and non-corporate sector (see Table 1.8). More severe labor 
market frictions lead to a decrease of total output in the corporate sector and to an 
increase of output in the non-corporate sector. The reduction of the corporate sector 
output is due to the fact that there are fewer firm-worker matches in equilibrium, while 
the increase in total output in the non-corporate sector is due to the increase in the 
number of workers using self-employment as a stopgap. Labor market frictions also have 
implications for the productivity of firms in both sectors. The lower interest rate in 
equilibrium increases the amount of capital firms rent, which increases the average output 
of firms in the corporate sector. However, the average output of self-employed workers 
decreases when labor market frictions increase. This reduction in average output is not 
only a consequence of the increased number of workers using self-employment as a 
stopgap, but is also due to a reduction in the average productivity of the businesses of 
entrepreneurs. The reason for the lower productivity of entrepreneurs is twofold. First, 
the reduction of wealth holdings in steady state results in workers entering 
entrepreneurship with lower levels of wealth, which reduces the average productivity of 
new entrepreneurs. Secondly, the lower interest rate also leads existing entrepreneurs to 
save less, and therefore the businesses of entrepreneurs grow at a slower rate. The lower 
initial productivity of new entrepreneurs and the lower growth rate of existing 
entrepreneurs explain the decrease in the entrepreneurs' productivity. 
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4.3.3.  Wealth Distribution 
    The main problem with the calibrated version of the model is that it fails to reproduce 
the wealth distribution observed in the data. The calibrated model produces a very large 
spike in the wealth distribution, which is not observed in the data.  Figure 1.3 presents the 
wealth distribution observed in the PSID sample used to calibrate the model. The figure 
shows that the wealth distribution presents a spike at a wealth level close to zero. The 
model fails to reproduce this fact. Figure 1.4 presents the wealth distribution obtained 
using the baseline calibration of the model.22 As can clearly seen, the wealth  
 
Figure 1.3. Wealth Distribution - PSID 
 
NOTE: The distribution is plotted conditional on wealth being positive.  The PSID 
sample only includes households heads aged 21-60. 
 
 
                                                 




Figure 1.4. Wealth Distribution - Model 
 
Figure 1.5. Spike Close-up - Model 
 
NOTE: This graph plots the portion of the economy’s wealth distribution for households 
between 20,000 and 70,000. 
 
distribution generated by the model presents a very large spike at $47,000. This spike is a 
result of the characteristics of the saving function of the matched workers without a 
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business project, who represent about 84% of workers in the economy.  Figure 1.6 plots 
the saving rate for an unmatched worker receiving the median wage in the economy.23 
Notice that the saving rates are positive for workers with wealth below $47,000 and 
negative for workers with wealth above $47,000. This then explains the peak of the 
wealth distribution at $47,000. The existence of agents with wealth level below the peak 
is mainly explained by the presence of unmatched workers without a business project, 
who have negative saving rates throughout the wealth domain. Given the relatively short 
duration of unemployment and stopgap self-employment spells and the high saving rates 
of unmatched workers without a business project, the calibrated model fails to generate a 
relatively high fraction of workers with wealth holdings close to zero, as observed in the 
data.   
 
Figure 1.6. Saving Rates – Matched Workers without a Business Project. 
 
NOTE: The wage used in the graph equals the median wage in the economy. 
                                                 
23 For the wages observed in the economy in equilibrium, the location of the saving rate is barely affected 




    The model developed in this dissertation chapter generates rich interactions between 
labor market frictions, credit constraints and self-employment that have implications for 
worker decision rules as well as some key aggregate variables. The presence of labor 
market frictions and credit constraints generates both entrepreneurial and stopgap self-
employment, and affects workers' decision to become self-employed. In particular, labor 
market frictions create a motive not to enter self-employment, which I label fear of 
failure. In the model, the fear of failure is based on the probability that an entrepreneur 
loses the business project and experiences a spell of unemployment. While this is not 
costless, a two or three month spell of unemployment is unlikely to be a major cost to the 
worker. However, there are other costs not included in this model that might be more 
important. For example, workers may have to disrupt their career path and human capital 
accumulation to become entrepreneurs. If workers have to re-enter at or close to the 
bottom of the career ladder when they return to the corporate sector as a worker, the fear 
of failure may play a much more important role. 
    The model also reveals that labor market frictions and credit constraints on 
entrepreneurs have important general equilibrium implications. Tighter credit constraints 
on entrepreneurs not only reduce the total output produced by the businesses of 
entrepreneurs, but also increase the proportion of workers using self-employment as a 
stopgap as well as the duration of the stopgap self-employment spells. Meanwhile, more 
severe labor market frictions not only reduce aggregate output and increase the number of 
workers who are unemployed or using self-employment as a stopgap, but also lead to a 
reduction in the average productivity of entrepreneurs. 
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    While both the theoretical and numerical findings show the importance of analyzing 
the interactions of labor market frictions, credit constraints and self-employment in a 
general equilibrium setting, one of the limitations of the existing model is that it cannot 
generate a wealth distribution that resembles that in the US data. This is partly due to the 
strength of the precautionary saving motive, which leads relatively poor workers to have 
high saving rates while employed at firms to avoid finding themselves in the stopgap 
state in the future. As a result, the wealth distribution that emerges in the stationary 
equilibrium does not have many poor workers. This is a standard result in incomplete 
markets models where workers face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Researchers have 
solved this problem by modeling different types of government insurance programs, 
which reduce the strength of the precautionary saving motive. Introducing some type of 
insurance into my model to obtain a more realistic wealth distribution is left for future 
work. However, as long as this insurance is not complete, the interactions of credit 
constraints, labor market frictions and self-employment analyzed in this chapter are likely 
to remain relevant for explaining the main features of the equilibrium.   
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Chapter 2: Stopgap Self-Employment: Evidence from the PSID. 
 
1. Introduction 
    Economists studying the reasons why workers become self-employed have 
traditionally argued that some workers are "pulled" into self-employment while others are 
"pushed" into it (Parker 2004, Dawson et al. 2009). Workers pulled into self-employment 
are those who choose to become self-employed due to the pecuniary and/or non-
pecuniary benefits of being self-employed.24 Workers pushed into self-employment are 
those who become self-employed after failing to find a paid job working for others. If 
workers become self-employed for different reasons, one would then expect to observe 
important differences in behavior between different groups of self-employed workers. 
Workers pushed into self-employment should have relatively short self-employment 
spells, using self-employment as a stopgap until they find a job working for others. On 
the other hand, workers pulled into self-employment should have longer self-employment 
spells. 
    Despite the emphasis given in the literature to the fact that workers become self-
employed for different reasons, most of the empirical work on self-employment does not 
take into account the different reasons why workers are self-employed. All self-employed 
workers are usually grouped together and their characteristics and behavior are compared 
to those working for others. Not taking into account the different reasons why workers 
                                                 
24 The most commonly mentioned non-pecuniary reasons to become self-employed are time flexibility, job 
satisfaction, the value of being your own boss and the prestige associated with owning a business. 
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are self-employed could lead to misleading conclusions or results that are hard to 
interpret, especially when the researcher is interested in studying a particular subgroup of 
self-employed workers. The empirical literature on entrepreneurship presents a good 
example of this point. Several studies consider a worker to be an entrepreneur if the 
worker is self-employed.25 Now, if some workers are using self-employment as a 
stopgap, some estimates of interest might be biased given the presence of a subgroup of 
workers that behave differently than the group of interest. For example, if workers using 
self-employment as a stopgap have short self-employment spells, the inclusion of stopgap 
self-employed workers will result in higher estimates of business failure rates among 
entrepreneurs. 
    This dissertation chapter revisits results in the empirical literature in self-employment, 
being careful to treat workers using self-employment as a stopgap separately from 
workers that are self-employed for other reasons. Particular attention is paid to the group 
of workers using self-employment as a stopgap, given that little is known about them. My 
first task is to distinguish in the data workers using self-employment as a stopgap from 
those that are self-employed for other reasons. Previous empirical work treats self-
employment as uniform in part because most surveys don't ask workers why they chose 
self-employment. One of the contributions of this chapter is to introduce three different 
working definitions of stopgap self-employment. The first definition follows Rasteletti 
(2009a), who defines a worker as stopgap self-employed if he searches for a job while 
self-employed. The second definition is based on business ownership. Stopgap self-
employed workers are those who report being self-employed but not owning a business. 
                                                 
25 Studies using self-employment as a proxy for entrepreneurship include Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), 
Evans and Leighton (1989), and Hamilton (2000), among others. 
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The third definition combines the two previous definitions, defining a worker as stopgap 
self-employed if he is either searching for a job or reports not owning a business. Given 
these definitions, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has all the relevant 
information needed to classify self-employed workers into those using self-employment 
as stopgap and those that are self-employed for other reasons. 
    My findings on stopgap self-employment are similar regardless of which measure I 
use: 1) Stopgap self-employment prevails mostly among young workers and among those 
who experience unemployment. 2) Stopgap self-employment is also relatively high 
among minorities, women and workers with low educational achievement. 3) Workers 
using self-employment as a stopgap have very short self-employment spells. 4) An 
important fraction of stopgap self-employed workers work as laborers and in service 
related occupations. 
    I also find liquidity constraints, labor market conditions and workers' labor market 
histories do not affect all self-employed workers equally. While having more wealth 
increases the probability of becoming self-employed for workers that do not use self-
employment as a stopgap, the effect of wealth on the probability of entering stopgap self-
employment presents an inverted U shape, with the peak at a relatively low wealth levels. 
Workers' labor market histories, meanwhile, are only relevant for stopgap self-
employment. More specifically, being unemployed increases the probability of becoming 
stopgap self-employed, but has no effect on the probability of becoming self-employed 
for other reasons. 
    Furthermore, I find that workers using self-employment as a stopgap are far more 
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likely to leave self-employment. Regardless of whether the worker is using self-
employment as a stopgap, self-employed workers that have spent more years in self-
employment are less likely to leave self-employment. Interestingly, wealth seems to have 
no effect on the probability of leaving stopgap self-employment. 
    The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, I describe the 
dataset and discuss my definitions of self-employment and stopgap self-employment. I 
also present descriptive statistics to characterize how self-employed workers differ from 
other workers, and how stopgap self-employed workers differ from other self-employed 
workers. In section 3, I study transitions into self-employment, both as a stopgap and for 
other reasons, paying particular attention to the effects of wealth and labor market 
conditions on workers' decision to transition into self-employment. In section 4, I analyze 
transitions out of self-employment. Finally, I present conclusions in section 5. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1. Data Description 
    The data used for this study are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). The PSID is a large panel data set that has followed a fixed set of workers and 
their spin-offs since 1968. Until 1997 surveys were conducted on a yearly basis. Since 
1997, surveys have been done every other year. An important advantage of the PSID over 
other data sets is that it has information on workers' financial wealth. The PSID started 
asking questions on wealth in 1984. For the next fifteen years, wealth questions were 
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asked every 5 years, and since 1999 they have been included in every survey. The 
samples I examine in this study are centered on the years 1989 and 1994. The reason for 
choosing these years is two-fold. First, data on wealth is available in those two years. 
Second, if years after 1997 were used, much of the high frequency dynamics in 
employment decisions would disappear given that data is collected only biannually. 
    Following Hurst and Lusardi (2004), I merge data centered on 1989 and 1994 in order 
to get an adequate sample size. I restrict the sample to male household heads aged 21-60 
to reduce variation in labor force participation. I also drop observations on farmers, farm 
laborers or farm managers because agricultural self-employment has different features 
than other forms of self-employment. The resulting sample contains 9,808 observations, 
with 57.62% of them centered around 1994.  
2.2. Definition of Self-Employment 
    Defining self-employment and identifying self-employed workers is not trivial. The 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), organized by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), defines self-employment jobs as those where the 
remuneration is directly dependent upon the profits derived from the goods and services 
produced. Self-employed workers are those who hold a self-employment job. There are 
two points worth highlighting about this definition. First, it allows workers with multiple 
jobs to be both self-employed and in paid-employment. Second, this definition excludes 
from self-employment those workers who receive a salary from their own business, given 
that remuneration is then not directly dependent upon the profits. 
    The definition of self-employment used in this dissertation chapter departs from the 
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ICLS definition on the two points mentioned above. A worker is considered to be self-
employed if and only if he reports being self-employed in his main job. This definition 
does not allow workers to be both self-employed and in paid-employment. Workers who 
have a second self-employment job are not considered to be self-employed if their 
primary job is in paid-employment. Whether a job is a main job or a secondary job is 
self-assessed by the worker. My definition also departs from the ICLS definition in that it 
allows workers who receive a wage or salary from their business to be considered self-
employed. In the sample, 42.11% of those reporting being self-employed on their main 
job also report receiving a salary in that job. Overall, 11.44% of the workers in my 
sample report being self-employed in their main job at the time of the interview. 
 
2.3. Descriptive Statistics of Self-Employed Workers 
    Before comparing workers using self-employment as a stopgap and workers that are 
self-employed for other reasons, I present some descriptive statistics for all self-employed 
workers and compare them with the characteristics of those working for others. The 
definitions of the variables used below are presented in the appendix. 
    Consistent with Evans and Leighton (1989) and others, self-employed workers tend to 
be older and more educated on average, with a predominance of married males (see Table 
A2 in the appendix). Self-employment is particularly low among blacks, the unmarried 
and very young workers (see Table A1). Self-employed workers also tend to be wealthier 
and have a higher hourly labor income on average (see Table A2). While looking at 
means can be misleading given the skewness of the labor income and wealth 
59 
 
distributions, the self-employed also have higher median wealth and labor income.26 
    Another important feature of the data is that dispersion in hourly labor income and 
wealth is much higher for self-employed workers than for other workers (see the 90-10th 
percentile differentials in Table A2). The standard deviation of hourly income for self-
employed workers is over three and a half times higher than among workers in paid-
employment. For wealth, the standard deviation among self-employed workers is almost 
four and a half times higher than that among workers in paid-employment. Given the 
high dispersion in labor income and wealth among self-employed workers, treating the 
self-employed as a homogenous group might not be a good idea. In what follows, I study 
workers using self-employment as a stopgap separately from other self-employed 
workers. 
2.4. Stopgap and Other Self-Employed Workers 
2.4.1. Definitions of Stopgap Self-Employment 
    Stopgap self-employment refers to the use of self-employment as a temporary 
substitute for other (more desired) types of employment. Even if the theoretical notion of 
stopgap self-employment is straightforward, empirically distinguishing workers using 
self-employment as a stopgap from other self-employed workers is not. Given that there 
is no uncontroversial way of identifying stopgap self-employed workers in the data, I use 
three different working definitions of stopgap self-employment. The first definition is 
related to job search while the second is related to business ownership. The third 
                                                 
26 One needs to be careful when interpreting differences in reported labor income between those working 
for firms and self-employed workers. Most who work for firms do not report their firm's contributions to 
health insurance, retirement plans and social security. Self-employed workers do not receive these benefits. 
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definition is a combination of the previous two. 
    According to the first definition, a worker is stopgap self-employed if he is currently 
self-employed and searching for a job. This definition corresponds to the one used in the 
theoretical work of Rasteletti (2009a). To identify whether a worker is looking for a job, I 
use the PSID question "Have you been looking for another job during the past four 
weeks?" If the answer to this question by a self-employed worker is yes, I classify him as 
a stopgap self-employed. In my sample, 6.91% of all self-employed workers are stopgap 
self-employed according to this definition. This is likely to be an underestimate of the 
extent of stopgap self-employment, because it does not include discouraged workers. 
These workers are willing to work for others, but are not currently searching because they 
perceive a low probability of finding a job. 
    According to our second definition, a worker is stopgap self-employed if he is 
currently self-employed and reports not owning a business. To identify business owners I 
use the PSID question "Did you (or anyone else in the family there) own a business or 
have a financial interest in any business enterprise?" If the worker reports not owning a 
business, I classify him as a stopgap self-employed.  In my sample, 16.90% of all self-
employed workers are stopgap self-employed according to this definition. The estimated 
extent of stopgap self-employment is thus over twice as large using this definition, 
compared to the definition based on job search. 
    Business ownership has been used to identify self-employed workers in the previous 
empirical literature on entrepreneurship, with entrepreneurs being defined as self-
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employed business owners.27 In the PSID data, however, many self-employed workers 
declare not owning a business. I use this difference in self-perception to distinguish 
among the self-employed. This is sensible strategy for two reasons: First, introspectively, 
it seems likely that a worker using self-employment as a stopgap would be less likely to 
consider his income generating activity a business. Secondly, if one takes the subsample 
of self-employed workers and runs a probit model to estimate the likelihood of remaining 
self-employed for at least one more year controlling for worker characteristics and a 
dummy variable for self-reported business ownership, the coefficient of this dummy 
variable is positive and highly significant.28 This result seems to imply that self-employed 
workers who report not owning a business are less attached to self-employment, 
something one would expect from workers using self-employment as a stopgap. 
    The third definition of stopgap self-employment is a combination of the previous two. 
A worker is stopgap self-employed if he is currently self-employed and searching for a 
job or if he is currently self-employed and reports not owning a business. According to 
this definition of entrepreneurship, 21.07% of the self-employed workers in the sample 
are stopgap self-employed. There is some overlap between the first two definitions of 
stopgap self-employment. Of all workers that are stopgap self-employed according to the 
job-search definition, 39.74% of them are also stopgap self-employed according to the 
business-ownership definition. For workers that have been self-employed for less than a 
year, this percentage increases to 47.61%. The overlap is much smaller when focusing on 
                                                 
27 This the definition of entrepreneurship is used by Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). Their entrepreneur also 
has to have an active management role in the business he owns. Information on active management is not 
available in the PSID for the years studied. 
28 The estimates of two probits, one for all self-employed workers and other for self-employed workers who 
have spent less than a year in self-employment, are reported in table A3 in the appendix. 
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workers that are stopgap self-employed according to the business ownership definition. 
This is not surprising given that there are two and a half times more stopgap self-
employed according to the business-ownership definition. Of all workers that are stopgap 
self-employed according to the business-ownership definition, 16.25% of them are also 
stopgap self-employed according to the job-search definition. For workers that have been 
self-employed for less than a year, this percentage increases to 21.11%. Table A4 in the 
appendix shows the degree of overlap for workers with different characteristics, and 
presents the correlation between the indicator variables for the two definitions for various 
subsamples. The correlation for the sample of all self-employed is 0.1660, which is 
statistically different from zero. 
    A notable feature of these definitions is that whether a worker is stopgap self-
employed or self-employed for other reasons might change over time. Some workers 
might initially use self-employment as a stopgap, only to realize later that self-
employment is a good opportunity for them. Once they stop looking for a job or start 
reporting they own a business, they become self-employed for other reasons according to 
my definitions. Similarly, workers might initially be drawn to self-employment by some 
of its pecuniary or non-pecuniary attributes, only to realize later that self-employment is 
not appropriate for them. These workers are initially not stopgap self-employed. Once 
these workers start looking for a job working for others or report not owning a business, 
they become stopgap self-employed. Depending on the definition of stopgap self-
employment, 7.17% (9.70%, 13.81%) of surviving self-employed workers transition from 
one type of self-employment to the other, using the job search (business-ownership and 
combined) definitions of stopgap self-employment, respectively. This convention for 
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reporting figures obtained from the three definitions will be used in the rest of the 
chapter. Transitions from one group of self-employed to the other are relatively more 
common among the initially stopgap self-employed, as 82.92% (55.14%, 55.58%) of 
those initially stopgap self-employed who remain self-employed next year transition to 
non-stopgap status, while the opposite figures are only 4.30% (5.56% and 8.43%) for 
those initially in non-stopgap self-employment. Transitions are more common among 
self-employed workers in their first year in self-employment, of whom 11.65% (17.24% 
and 18.66%) change groups. For those who have spent more than a year in self-
employment, only 5.80% (13.22% and 13.24%) change groups conditional on remaining 
self-employed. 
 
2.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
    Regardless of the definition used, stopgap self-employment is more prevalent among 
newly self-employed workers. Of all workers using self-employment as a stopgap, 51% 
(47% and 46%) have been self-employed for a year or less, and 71% (70% and 68%) 
have been self-employed for 2 years or less, using the job search (business-ownership and 
combined) definitions of stopgap self-employment, respectively. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of other self-employed workers that have been self-employed for a year or less 
is only 27% (25% and 24%), while the proportion self-employed for less than two years 
is 40% (37% and 36%). The kernel densities for years spent in self-employment are 
presented in Figure A1. 
    These differences are also reflected in the survival rate of newly self-employed 
workers, defined as those not self-employed in the previous year. While only 35.52% 
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(30.55% and 34.92%) of newly self-employed workers in the stopgap group remain self-
employed in the following year, 67.22% (74.42% and 76.59%) of other newly self-
employed remain self-employed in the following year. This difference becomes bigger by 
the second year. While only 21.39% (18.04% and 21.17%) of newly stopgap self-
employed workers remain self-employed for two years or more, 52.71% (59.30% and 
61.51%) of other newly self-employed workers remain self-employed for two years or 
more. 
    The stopgap self-employment rate is particularly high among newly self-employed 
workers who experienced an unemployment spell before becoming self-employed. I find 
that 12.70% (28.65% and 35.31%) of all newly self-employed workers who experienced 
unemployment immediately before becoming self-employed use self-employment as a 
stopgap (see Table A5). Meanwhile, 29.49% (20.44% and 19.53%) of newly stopgap 
self-employed workers experienced unemployment before becoming self-employed, 
while only 6.54% (5.88% and 5.30%) of other newly self-employed workers experienced 
unemployment before entering self-employment. These differences are consistent with 
theories suggesting that some workers are pushed into self-employment. 
    Relatively high rates of stopgap self-employment are also observed among blacks, 
singles and very young workers (see Table A5). Stopgap self-employment is also 
relatively high among high school drop-outs. It is interesting to note that the groups more 
likely to use self-employment as a stopgap also have low overall rates of self-
employment. 
    Stopgap self-employed workers have lower hourly income and lower wealth than other 
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self-employed workers (see Table A6). They also work fewer hours, which might reflect 
their lower commitment to the businesses they are running. 
2.4.3. Occupations and Industries 
    There are important differences in occupation and industry affiliation between workers 
that use self-employment as a stopgap and those who are self-employed for other reasons. 
Table A7 reports the proportions of workers in different occupation groups, conditional 
on being stopgap self-employed or being self-employed for other reasons. The main 
difference in the distribution over occupations is for managers and administrators. While 
41% (44%  and 45%) of those who are self-employed for other reasons report being a 
manager or an administrator, only 24%  (15% and 18%) of those using self-employment 
as a stopgap report being in that occupational group. Another important difference is for 
laborers, who comprise 11% (9% and 10%) of those using self-employment as a stopgap, 
but only around 4% of those self-employed for other reasons.  
    With respect to industry, all definitions suggest that there are relatively few stopgap 
workers in manufacturing (see Table A8). The job search definition suggests that there is 
a relatively high proportion of stopgap self-employed workers in agriculture, forestry, 
and fisheries as well. This result is not obtained using the other two definitions. 
Meanwhile, the business ownership and combined definitions suggest a relatively low 
proportion of stopgap self-employed workers in wholesale trade and a relatively high 





3. Transitions Into Self-Employment 
    Worker transitions into self-employment have received plenty of attention in the 
literature given their relevance for business creation. Two questions that have been 
widely studied are: 1) how do individual labor market histories and labor market 
conditions affect workers' decision to become self-employed? and 2) how does access to 
credit affect workers' decision to become self-employed? With respect to the first 
question, Evans and Leighton (1989) find that being unemployed increases the 
probability of becoming self-employed. Blanchflower and Oswald (1991) find that higher 
regional unemployment rates also increase the probability of entering self-employment. 
Rissman (2003) finds that young workers are more likely to enter self-employment in 
recessions and leave in booms. With respect to access to credit, researchers have usually 
looked at the effect of workers' wealth on the decision to become self-employed. A 
positive effect of wealth on the probability of becoming self-employed is usually 
interpreted as credit constraints preventing workers from starting their businesses. 
Several studies have found evidence that higher levels of wealth increase the probability 
of transitioning into self-employment.29 More recently, Hurst and Lusardi (2003) found 
that this positive relation is only present among the very rich. 
    This section differs from previous studies in the literature in that I study transitions into 
stopgap self-employment separately from other transitions into self-employment. To 
study transitions into self-employment, I use the sample of all agents who are not self-
employed in 1989 or 1994. I first estimate a probit model of the probability of observing 
                                                 
29 Studies finding a positive effect of wealth on the probability of transitioning into self-employment 
include Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989), and Evans and Leighton (1989), among others. 
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a worker transitioning into self-employment in the following year. This is the type of 
model usually estimated in the literature. I then estimate separate probit models of the 
probability of transitioning into stopgap self-employment and self-employment for other 
reasons. This allows me to study conditions under which workers are more likely to enter 
self-employment with a stopgap motive or for other reasons. Given that the effects of 
wealth and unemployment duration on entry into self-employment might be non-linear, I 
include these two variables as fifth-order polynomials.30 The estimated average marginal 
effects implied by these different probits are presented in table A9.31 
    Several findings are worth highlighting. First, being black has no significant effect on 
the probability of becoming stopgap self-employed, while it decreases the probability of 
becoming self-employed for other reasons, although the latter effect is not significant for 
the combined definition of stopgap self-employment. Second, having higher labor income 
reduces the probability of transitions into stopgap self-employment. Thirdly , as found by 
other papers in the literature, having been self-employed previously has a highly 
significant positive effect on the probability of transitioning into both types of self-
employment. 
    Distinguishing workers using self-employment as a stopgap from other self-employed 
workers allows me to uncover some interesting effects of unemployment on the 
                                                 
30 I use a third order polynomial in wealth when estimating transitions into stopgap self-employment to 
increase precision of my estimates given the small number of such transitions. Results are qualitatively 
similar if I use a fifth order polynomial. 
31 In this paper marginal effects are calculated for each individual, and then averaged across individuals. 
The marginal effect of a variable X is calculated in the following way: for each individual the estimated 
probability is calculated given the worker's characteristics. Then, a new probability is calculated for each 
individual by marginally increasing the value taken by X. The difference between these two probabilities is 
then calculated and divided by the increment in X. If X is entered as a second or higher order polynomial, 
the second probability is calculated by simultaneously increasing all terms in the X polynomial. 
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probability of becoming self-employed. I find that being unemployed has a positive and 
highly significant effect on the probability of transitioning into stopgap self-employment, 
but a smaller and insignificant effect on other transitions into self-employment. These 
findings suggest that the positive effect of being unemployed on the probability of 
becoming self-employed found in previous literature is mainly driven by workers 
transitioning into stopgap self-employment. I also find that receiving unemployment 
compensation reduces the probability of transitioning into both types of self-employment, 
although the effect is not significant for transitions into stopgap self-employment when 
the job search definition is used, and for transitions into non-stopgap self-employment 
when the business ownership and combined definitions are used.  
    Some interesting effects appear when studying the effects of labor market conditions 
on transitions into self-employment. Given that the PSID does not have information on 
county level unemployment for 1994, we use the subsample of 1989 observations to look 
at how the county unemployment rate affects workers' decision to become self-
employed.32 Looking at the effects of county level unemployment rates on the probability 
of becoming self-employed is important because different regional unemployment rates 
might affect how difficult it is for an unemployed worker to find a new job. All else 
equal, one would expect that the higher the local unemployment rate, the higher the 
probability of transitioning into stopgap self-employment. I re-estimate the probit model 
used before, but now including two new control variables: the county unemployment rate 
and the county unemployed rate interacted with a dummy for being unemployed. 
                                                 
32 While county level unemployment rates for 1994 are relatively easy to obtain, one cannot construct 
county level unemployment rates using the public release of the PSID because the PSID has suppresses 
information on the county of residence. 
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Contrary to what one might expect, I find that the interaction term for being unemployed 
and the unemployment rates at the county level has a negative effect on the probability of 
becoming self-employed, although the effect is not significant (see Table A10 in the 
appendix). This negative effect might reflect the fact that workers become less willing to 
to enter self-employment, given that it might take them longer to transition out of self-
employment when the unemployment rate is higher. 
    Finally, I look at the effect of wealth on the probability of becoming self-employed. 
Previous researchers have focused on wealth to study the effects of liquidity constraints 
on the probability that a worker starts a business. However, one would expect liquidity 
constraints to play different roles for workers transitioning into entrepreneurship and for 
workers transitioning into stopgap self-employment. For workers transitioning into 
stopgap self-employment, wealth might be important not because workers do not have 
sufficient liquidity to start their business projects, but because the lack of financial 
resources might force workers to choose self-employment over unemployment. These 
differences in the effect of wealth are confirmed by the data (see Figure A2). The 
probability that a worker enters self-employment for other reasons is monotonically 
increasing in wealth (marginal effects at different quintiles of the wealth distribution are 
presented on Table A11).  Meanwhile, the probability of entering stopgap self-
employment as a function of wealth has an inverted-U shape, peaking at $95,000 
($73,000 and $64,440) for the search (business ownership and combined) definition. 
These peaks are located at the 61st (54th and 51st) percentiles of the wealth distribution 
including all workers. When looking at the wealth distribution of self-employed workers 
only, these peaks are located at the 33th (28th and 25th) percentiles of the wealth 
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distribution. To better understand the reason behind the inverted U-shape, I ask whether 
wealth plays different roles for workers who experienced an unemployment spell and 
workers who did not. This question is relevant because the U-shape could be a 
consequence of a composition effect, given that 30 to 40% of workers who become 
stopgap self-employed experienced unemployment before transitioning into self-
employment. Therefore, I re-estimate the model interacting a third order polynomial on 
worker's wealth with a dummy capturing whether the worker experienced an 
unemployment spell prior to self-employment. The marginal effects obtained from these 
probits are reported in Table A12 in the appendix. This estimation reveals that the 
inverted U-shape of the impact of wealth on the probability of stopgap self-employment 
is due largely to people who experienced unemployment (see Figure A3). For all 
definitions of stopgap self-employment the probability of becoming stopgap self-
employed has an inverted U-shape in wealth for those workers who experienced 
unemployment between the two interview periods.33 For workers who did not experience 
unemployment, the probability of becoming stopgap self-employed is monotonically 
decreasing in wealth for the business ownership and combined definition, and decreasing 
over most of the wealth distribution for the job search definition. 
    So far we have treated wealth as exogenous. In fact, wealth can be endogenous with 
respect to occupational choice, due to its possible correlation with preferences or 
unobserved ability. The endogeneity of wealth could bias the estimated effects of wealth 
on the probability of transitioning into different types of self-employment. This 
                                                 
33 The probability of becoming stopgap self-employed for workers who experienced unemployment peaks 
at $97,000 ($36,500 and $40,000) for the search (business ownership and combined) definition. The 
probability of becoming stopgap self-employed for workers who did not experience unemployment peaks 
at $82,000 for the search definition. 
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endogeneity problem is more likely to be present in transitions into non-stopgap self-
employment. Buera (2003) argues that in the presence of borrowing constraints, workers 
that want to become entrepreneurs will accumulate more wealth while working so that 
they can start their businesses. If this is true, wealth will then be correlated with 
unobserved variables that make workers more likely to become an entrepreneur, creating 
a bias in the estimates of wealth effects. To get around this problem, we use an 
instrumental variable approach. The instrumental variable used is an estimated measure 
of regional changes in house prices, introduced by Hurst and Lusardi (2004). This 
variable is constructed in the following way: first, I generate a variable capturing the 
change in home value of non-movers over the periods 1985-88 and 1990-93. These home 
values are self-reported in the PSID. I then regress this variable on household 
characteristics (age, education, race, gender, marital status, family size, income, 
employment status, and initial house value), region dummies and state economic 
conditions (state gross domestic product per capita in 1985 and 1990, growth rate of state 
GDP per capita between 1985 and 1988 and between 1990 and 1993, and the state 
unemployment rate in levels from 1985 to 1988 and from 1990 to 1993).34 The region 
dummies capture regional variation in growth in house prices controlling for changes in 
the state economic conditions. A new variable capturing differences in regional housing 
value appreciation is created by assigning to each household the estimated coefficient on 
the region dummy for the state they live in. This new variable is used as the instrument 
for wealth. 
                                                 
34 Hurst and Lusardi include the region dummies and state economic conditions to control for the fact that 
house prices are not purely exogenous, but rather be affected by some of the same factors that affect 
household decision to become self-employed. 
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    To make sure that the inverted U shape for the effect of wealth on the probability of 
becoming stopgap self-employed is not a consequence of the endogeneity problem, I now 
estimate a linear probability model including all the same controls as in the previous 
probit model but instrumenting the third order polynomial in wealth with a third order 
polynomial in regional house appreciation. The estimates are reported in Table A13 in the 
appendix. The estimated effect of wealth on the probability of transitioning into stopgap 
self-employment maintains its inverted U shape (see Figure A4), but this shape is not 
statistically significant. More specifically, the predicted probability is never different 
from zero. This might be due to a relatively weak first-stage while implementing the 
instrumental variable estimation (see R2 of the first-stage regression on Table A13).  
 
4. Transitions Out Of Self-Employment 
    In the PSID sample used, the proportion of self-employed workers that leaves self-
employment from one year to the next is 20.52%. This proportion differs greatly among 
those who have spent more or less than one year in self-employment. For those who have 
spent more than a year in self-employment, the proportion leaving is 15.54%. For those 
self-employed for less than a year, the proportion that leaves is over two times higher, at 
33.95%. As one might expect, the proportion of workers leaving self-employment is 
particularly high among those using self-employment as a stopgap (see Table A14). The 
proportion of stopgap self-employed workers that leaves self-employment is between 
three and five times higher than that of other self-employed workers, depending on the 
definition used. A large difference in exit rates between stopgap and other self-employed 
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workers is observed both among newly self-employed workers and workers who have 
spent more than a year in self-employment. 
    To study transitions out of self-employment in greater detail I estimate two sets of 
probit models of the probability that a currently self-employed worker will leave self-
employment within a year. In the first set, the probits are estimated using the sample of 
all self-employed workers, and a dummy variable is included to capture whether the 
worker is stopgap self-employed. Given the relatively high exit rate of self-employed 
workers during their first year in self-employment, I also estimate separate probits for 
those who have spent more or less than a year in self-employment. Next, I estimate 
separate probits for the samples of stopgap and non-stopgap self-employed workers. This 
allows other variables to have different effects for the stopgap and non-stopgap self-
employed. Given that the effect of time spent in self-employment might be non-linear, 
this variable is entered as a fifth-order polynomial in all probits. 
    The estimated average marginal effects for the first set of regressions are presented in 
Table A15. As one might expect, using self-employment as a stopgap has a large positive 
and highly significant effect on the probability of leaving self-employment. Exits from 
self-employment seem not to be affected by educational achievement, expect for newly 
self-employed high-school graduates. Meanwhile, being married, being older and 
working longer hours reduce the probability of leaving self-employment for self-
employed workers with more than a year in self-employment. Finally, time spent in the 
current self-employment spell has a highly significant negative effect on the probability 
of leaving self-employment in the sample of all self-employed workers, but positive and 




    Estimating different probits for the stopgap and nonstop self-employed does not shed 
much light on transitions out of self-employment since few coefficients are statistically 
significant (See Table A16). In the case of workers using self-employment as a stopgap, 
no clear pattern emerges. Most age groups dummies have a negative effect, with a few 
being significant. Being black decreases the probability of leaving self-employment 
according to the job search definition but increases it according to the business ownership 
definition. Other individual characteristics might fail to have significant effects simply 
because transitions are calculated over a one-year period. In the sample, the median 
duration of an unemployment spell is nine weeks. A year seems to be enough time for 
most stopgap self-employed workers to find a job working for others. In the case of other 
self-employed workers, hours worked and being married also have a negative and 
significant effect. Time spent in self-employment has a negative effect, although it is only 
significant when using the business ownership definition. 
    Finally, I look at the determinants of whether exiting self-employed workers transition 
into paid-employment, unemployment or out-of-the-labor-force. I estimate different 
probit models of the probability that a self-employed worker transitions into paid-
employment, unemployment or out of the labor force, conditional on being self-
employed. All these models have a dummy variable capturing whether the worker is 
stopgap self-employed.35 The estimated average marginal effects are presented in Table 
A17. Interestingly, being stopgap self-employed has a large positive effect on the 
                                                 
35 One could also estimate separate probits for currently stopgap and non-stopgap self-employed workers 
leaving self-employment within a year. The problem is that the resulting samples from this partition 
become too small, rendering all coefficients insignificant. 
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probability of transitioning into paid-employment and insignificant effects on the 
probability of transitioning into unemployment. Given that stopgap self-employed 
workers are far more likely to leave self-employment, the non-significance of the stopgap 
dummy for transitions into unemployment  seems to imply that stopgap self-employed 
workers are less willing than other self-employed workers to become unemployed. This 
result is consistent with the notion that the stopgap self-employed use self-employment as 
an employment option to avoid unemployment. Interestingly, being stopgap self-
employed increases the probability of exiting the labor force, although this effect is not 
significant when the job search definition is used. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 This chapter uses data from the PSID to revisit existing results in the empirical literature 
on self-employment, treating workers using self-employment as a stopgap separately 
from workers that are self-employed for other reasons. The main features of stopgap self-
employment unveiled in this chapter are the following: 1) Stopgap self-employment is 
most common among young workers, those who have experienced recent unemployment, 
minorities, women and workers with low educational achievement. 2) Workers using 
self-employment as a stopgap have relatively short self-employment spells. 3) Workers in 
stopgap self-employment tend to have lower hourly labor income and to work fewer 
hours. 4) An important fraction of stopgap self-employed workers work as laborers and in 
service related occupations. This chapter also discovers different patterns of transition 
into and out of self-employment for these different types of self-employed workers. For 
those not using self-employment as a stopgap, the probability of entering self-
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employment increases monotonically with wealth. On the other hand, for those using 
self-employment as a stopgap, the probability of entering self-employment has an 
inverted U shape as a function of wealth, with the peak at a relatively low wealth level. I 
also find that workers' labor market histories are only relevant for stopgap self-
employment. More specifically, being unemployed increases the probability of becoming 
stopgap self-employed, but has no effect on the probability of becoming self-employed 
for other reasons. 
    This dissertation chapter should serve as a reminder to researchers that not all workers 
are self-employed for the same reasons. Estimates of the effects of certain variables of 
interest on the behavior of the self-employed or the self-employed-to-be are an average of 
the effects on different types of self-employed workers. This averaging can create biases 
that hide the real effects of interest. This dissertation chapter suggests that one should 
distinguish effects on workers using self-employment as a stopgap from effects on other 
self-employed workers. More work should be devoted to finding new and better ways of 
distinguishing different types of self-employed workers, in order to get more precise 
estimates of effects of interest.   
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Chapter 3: A Theory on the Impact of Technological Change on 
Entrepreneurship and Unemployment.  




    Technological growth, entrepreneurship, and unemployment influence each other in 
numerous ways, forming a trio of inter-related components, yet the literature has 
traditionally emphasized the endogenous determination of one or two components of this 
trio, and the exogenous impact of one component on another, without taking into account 
the third. Consider the impact of entrepreneurship on growth. Endogenous growth theory 
suggests that entrepreneurship is an important determinant of growth. Such models 
predict or assume that an increase in the resources devoted toward innovation and R&D 
mechanically lead to higher growth, implying positive correlation between 
entrepreneurship and growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Segerstrom, 1991, 1998; Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995); entrepreneurship is the means by 
which to launch, but not sustain, the economy, such that eventually it ceases altogether 
(Peretto, 1998, 1999a); and the growth rate and rate of entry may be positively or 
negatively correlated as the economy evolves over time (Peretto, 1999b). Next consider 
the impact of growth on unemployment. An increase in growth leads to a decrease in 
unemployment when technological change is disembodied (Pissarides, 1990); or an 
increase in unemployment when technological change is embodied (Aghion and Howitt, 
1994). Finally, Fonseca et al. (2001) study the endogenous determination of 
entrepreneurship and unemployment, to find that the two are negatively related. 
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    We argue that the three components of technological growth, entrepreneurship, and 
unemployment should not be studied in isolation or in pairs because doing so may 
engender a misleading over-simplification. Indeed, we find that these important results in 
the literature concerning the impact of growth on unemployment no longer necessarily 
hold when one incorporates entrepreneurship; and the result concerning the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and unemployment no longer necessarily holds when one 
incorporates growth. Whereas, ideally, a theory should have all three components be 
endogenous, we pursue the first step towards integration in a model with exogenous 
growth that, nonetheless, attempts to include hints of endogenous growth theory. 
    By developing a unified framework incorporating occupational choice and different 
types of labor markets and exogenous technological change, this paper provides a 
comprehensive taxonomy of the various mechanisms by which technological growth 
affects entrepreneurship and unemployment. The model is constructed as follows. There 
is a continuum of agents that choose between being a worker or an entrepreneur. 
Entrepreneurs create and manage jobs, while workers occupy the jobs created by 
entrepreneurs. Agents differ in terms of the number of workers they can manage if they 
become entrepreneurs; however, entrepreneurial ability does not affect an agent's 
productivity if he becomes a worker. In equilibrium, agents with sufficiently high ability 
become entrepreneurs, while those below a threshold level of ability become workers. 
We consider two types of exogenous technological change, disembodied and embodied. 
With disembodied technological change, the productivity of all jobs increases with the 
growth rate. With embodied technological change, only the productivity of new jobs 
increases with the growth rate, giving rise to creative destruction, the process by which 
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entrepreneurs destroy existing jobs in order to implement new technologies. Furthermore, 
we make two assumptions that are reduced-form representations of general equilibrium 
outcomes: we allow for the possibilities that technological growth augments the effective 
discount rate and enhances entrepreneurial ability at managing workers. 
    Given that the decision to become an entrepreneur may depend on the characteristics 
of the labor market, we analyze both forms of technological change under two different 
labor market structures. First, we consider the case of perfectly competitive labor 
markets. Workers can move freely between jobs, at no cost. Price competition among 
firms for workers guarantees that all workers are paid the same wage and that all 
entrepreneurs can hire all the workers they desire at the equilibrium wage. In this case, 
there are no unemployed agents or unfilled vacancies in equilibrium. Second, we analyze 
the case in which there are search frictions in the labor market. The allocation of jobs to 
workers takes place according to a process of search and matching, and unemployment 
can result in equilibrium. In order to find workers, entrepreneurs post vacancies; and in 
order to find jobs, workers engage in random search. 
    Technological growth has an impact on entrepreneurship via three mechanisms: the 
capitalization, firm size, and employment duration effects, relating to how growth affects 
the effective discount rate, entrepreneurial ability (which determines the optimal size of a 
firm), and the optimal duration of a job, respectively. The impact of these mechanisms on 
entrepreneurship differs depending on whether the labor market is frictionless. In the 
absence of labor market frictions, an increase in growth dampens entrepreneurship if and 
only if growth enhances entrepreneurial ability at managing workers, i.e. the firm size 
effect is present. Once labor market frictions are introduced, however, this result no 
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longer holds. The impact of an increase in technological growth on entrepreneurship 
depends on how the three mechanisms interact. While a positive capitalization effect 
enhances entrepreneurship, positive firm size and employment duration effects tend to 
dampen entrepreneurship under reasonable parameter restrictions. The overall effect 
thereby depends on the relative strength of each of the three competing forces. 
    The introduction of labor market frictions also allows us to study the impact of 
technological growth on unemployment, which operates via three mechanisms. First, 
there is the composition effect: by affecting an agent's decision to become an 
entrepreneur, growth influences the number of workers relative to entrepreneurs. All else 
being equal, the smaller is the proportion of agents that are entrepreneurs, the higher is 
the unemployment rate. Second, there is the job creation effect: a change in the 
proportion of entrepreneurs affects job creation, which in turn influences the probability 
that a worker finds a job. Given the occupational choice decision and optimal duration of 
a job, the more difficult it is for workers to find jobs, the higher is the unemployment 
rate. Third, there is the creative destruction effect: a higher growth rate decreases the 
optimal duration of a job, which tends to increase unemployment. 
    To summarize, technological growth may have a positive or negative impact on 
entrepreneurship and unemployment, in such a manner that any combination is possible. 
Overall, an increase in growth is more likely to enhance entrepreneurship and dampen 
unemployment when the interest rate does not increase significantly with growth, 
technological change is disembodied, and growth enhances entrepreneurial ability at 
managing workers. 
    The most influential theoretical works studying the effect of technological growth on 
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unemployment in an economy with labor market frictions are those of Pissarides (1990), 
Aghion and Howitt (1994), and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). These models differ 
from ours in that they do not include entrepreneurship, the endogenous determination of 
firm size, or the equilibrium effect of growth on the interest rate; thus, by not having an 
occupational choice decision or agents managing workers, the composition, job creation, 
and firm size effects are absent. Pissarides (1990) presents a model wherein the 
productivity of all existing jobs increases at the rate of technological change (i.e., it is 
disembodied). In this setting, unemployment is a decreasing function of growth: an 
increase in the growth rate reduces the effective discount rate, which leads to an increase 
in job creation and a reduction in unemployment. In Aghion and Howitt (1994), only the 
productivity of new jobs increases at the rate of technological change (i.e., it is 
embodied), capturing the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction that technological 
change renders jobs obsolete. In this setting, unemployment is an increasing function of 
growth: given the obsolescence of jobs, firms anticipate that jobs have a shorter life, 
which reduces job creation and increases unemployment. Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) 
present a model in which both embodied and disembodied technological change take 
place simultaneously. The impact of growth on unemployment is undetermined, but the 
authors find that in a calibrated version of their model, the negative effect of TFP growth 
on unemployment observed in the data is inconsistent with embodied technology. The 
reason for this result is that when technology is embodied, the capitalization effect has a 
much smaller quantitative impact on unemployment than the creative destruction effect. 
Finally, Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) criticize the Aghion and Howitt (1994) 
assumption, also made in Pissarides and Vallanti (2007), that jobs need to be destroyed in 
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order for firms to implement new technologies. The authors present a model in which 
technology can be updated, at some cost, without destroying jobs. The authors find that, 
depending on the cost of updating technology, higher growth can lead to either higher or 
lower unemployment: it is only in the case when updating technology is too expensive 
that higher growth leads to higher unemployment. 
    When one takes into account the additional mechanisms we identified by which 
technological growth affects unemployment, some of the key results in these and related 
papers no longer hold. Entrepreneurship gives rise to the composition effect of 
technological growth on unemployment; and the firm size effect operating via the impact 
of growth on entrepreneurial ability. The consequences of these effects can lead to 
reversals in common wisdom. Specifically, contrary to Pissarides (1990), we find that 
unemployment does not necessarily decline in response to an increase in the rate of 
disembodied technological change; contrary to Aghion and Howitt (1994), 
unemployment does not necessarily rise in response to an increase in the rate of 
embodied technological change; and contrary to Fonseca et al. (2001), entrepreneurship 
and unemployment are not necessarily negatively related when one takes into account 
their responses to a change in the growth rate. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of 
the model, discuss the mechanisms at work, and present figures that illustrate some of our 
main results. In section 3, we study in greater detail how technological change affects 
entrepreneurship in an economy with a frictionless labor market. In section 4, we perform 
a similar analysis in an economy with labor market frictions, and study how 





2. Overview of the Model 
    The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived agents, with their mass 
normalized to one. Following Fonseca et al. (2001), at any point in time, an agent 
chooses to become an entrepreneur who creates and manages jobs, or a worker occupying 
a job created by an entrepreneur. The number of workers an agent can manage is a 
function of his entrepreneurial ability α which is drawn from the distribution  with 
the support [0, ]. To become an entrepreneur, an agent pays the business start-up 
cost `[, where `[  !2	, t denotes the date, and , is the exogenous rate of 
technological growth. After paying the start-up cost, entrepreneurs post vacancies to hire 
workers. The cost of posting a vacancy is `[. Once a job has been filled, the 
entrepreneur has access to a production technology that is a linear function of labor up to 
the maximum number of workers the entrepreneur can manage. If the entrepreneur has 
more workers than the maximum, the extra workers are unproductive. The worker 
remains with the entrepreneur until the entrepreneur closes the job, the worker quits the 
job, or the job is exogenously destroyed. The exogenous destruction of jobs follows a 
Poisson process with arrival rate δ. When a worker is employed, he earns a wage O[. If 
a worker is unemployed, he has access to a home production technology with which he 
produces `[/. Neither entrepreneurs nor workers can save, such that consumption 
equals labor income. 
    The impact of technological growth on entrepreneurship depends on the nature of the 
labor market and the type of technological change. With respect to the nature of the labor 
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market, we study two cases. First, we consider perfectly competitive labor markets. 
Workers can move freely between jobs at no cost. Price competition among firms for 
workers guarantees that all workers are paid the same wage and that all entrepreneurs can 
hire all the workers they desire at the equilibrium wage. Thus, there are no unemployed 
agents or unfilled vacancies in equilibrium. Second, we consider search frictions in the 
labor market. The allocation of jobs to workers takes place according to a process of 
search and matching, and unemployment can result in equilibrium. In the absence of 
growth, this case corresponds to the model in Fonseca et al. (2001). 
    With respect to the type of technological change, we study two cases. First, we 
consider disembodied technological change: entrepreneurs update the technology used 
for production in all existing jobs immediately at no cost. Second, we consider embodied 
technological change: entrepreneurs destroy existing jobs in order to implement new 
technologies. The main difference between the two cases is that while the productivity of 
all jobs increases at the rate g in the disembodied case, only the productivity of new jobs 
increases at the rate g in the embodied case. 
    Finally, to capture the ways in which the rate of technological growth affects the 
interest rate and entrepreneurial ability at managing workers, we introduce the following 
two assumptions that are reduced-form representations of outcomes that would arise in a 
general equilibrium model of endogenous growth: 
     
    Assumption 1: Along the balanced growth path, the interest rate is 6  h,, where 
h, is a differentiable function. 
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    Assumption 2: Along the balanced growth path, the maximum number of workers an 
entrepreneur with ability α can manage is ,, where , is a differentiable function. 
     
    Before analyzing the four cases with or without labor market frictions and with 
embodied or disembodied technological change, we summarize the general structure of 
the model and advance some intuition of the results. Throughout the paper, we focus on 
the impact of technological change on entrepreneurship and unemployment along the 
balanced growth path. 
    Each of the four cases can be summarized by a system of two equations in two 
unknowns. First, using the same terminology as in Fonseca et al. (2001), there is the 
entrepreneurship equation, reflecting the agent's occupational choice decision. Denote the 
value of being a worker by N[ and the value of being an entrepreneur by <, [. The 
value of being an entrepreneur can also be expressed in terms of the value of opening a 
vacancy [: <, [  ,[  `[. We will show that [ and N[ are 
independent of , such that the occupational choice decision is governed by a reservation 
entrepreneurial ability : an agent with ability  becomes an entrepreneur if  ≥  , 
otherwise he becomes a worker. The reservation ability satisfies 
3.1                                                    N[ 7 `[,[  
    Second, there is the job creation equation, which ensures that the number of employed 
workers, entrepreneurs, and unemployed agents do not change over time. To derive this 
equation, first note that the proportion of employed and unemployed workers can be 
expressed as 
3.2                                                   
 7 _   
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where n is the proportion of employed workers, u is the proportion of unemployed agents, 
and 1   is the proportion of entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the number of jobs created 
by entrepreneurs is 
3.3                                                   _ 7    , ¡ ¢£¤ T 
where n is the number of filled jobs and v is the number of vacant jobs. Without labor 
market frictions, we have 
     0. The job creation equation is obtained by combining 
equations (3.2) and (3.3): 
3.4                                                      , ¡ ¢£¤ T 
    With labor market frictions, to ensure that the proportions of employed workers and 
entrepreneurs do not change of time, we require that the number of workers entering 
unemployment equals the number of workers leaving unemployment. We will show that 
for this condition to be satisfied, the following equation must hold: 
3.5                                     ,  ¡ 
¢£¤
  
.¥ 7 '1  !?`.¦§(¥%¥. 7 '1  !?`.¦§(¥%¥  
where  θ is the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, %¥ is the rate at which vacancies 
are filled, and T§ is the optimally chosen age at which to destroy a job. When 
technological change is disembodied, T§ is infinite; and when it is embodied, T§ is finite. 
Finally, we will show that the proportion of unemployed workers in the steady state is 
given by 
3.6                                             
  .. 7 '1  !?`.¦§(¥%¥ 
87 
 
    Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are graphical representations of the entrepreneurship and job 
creation equations for each of the four cases. The entrepreneurship curve is always 
upward sloping.36 Meanwhile, the job creation curve does not have the same slope in all 
cases. While the job creation curve is horizontal in a frictionless labor market, it is 
downward sloping with labor market frictions.37 Whether technological change is 
embodied or disembodied does not affect the proportion of entrepreneurs with frictionless 
labor markets. Keeping wages fixed, the value of being an entrepreneur is greater under 
disembodied (relative to embodied) technological change given that the employment 
duration is higher. However, as the number of entrepreneurs increases, the number of 
unfilled vacancies increases accordingly, leading to a rise in wages, which in turn reduces 
the value of being an entrepreneur and therefore the number of agents that become 
entrepreneurs in equilibrium. 
    With labor market frictions, the number of entrepreneurs is usually lower with 
embodied technological change, but it could be higher if the equilibrium ratio of 
vacancies to unemployment is low enough (see Figure 3.2).38 As in the case with 
                                                 
36 In the case with frictionless labor markets, the entrepreneurship curve is increasing in wages because 
higher wages increase the value of being a worker and reduce the value of being an entrepreneur. This then 
leads to an increase in the reservation ability. In the case with labor market frictions, a second effect is 
present. We show later in this paper that wages are an increasing function of θ, the ratio of vacancy to 
unemployment or labor market tightness. Therefore, for wages to be higher, the labor market tightness also 
has to be higher. Now, when labor market tightness is higher, it becomes more difficult for entrepreneurs to 
fill their vacancies, while it becomes easier for unemployed workers to find jobs. Therefore, the value of 
being an entrepreneur is reduced and the value of being unemployed increases. This second effect leads to a 
further increase in the reservation ability. 
37 To understand why the job creation curve is downward sloping when labor market frictions are present, 
one must first understand the relation between wages and θ, the ratio of vacancy to unemployment or labor 
market tightness. We show below that wages are increasing in labor market tightness. Now, when the 
reservation ability increases, there are fewer jobs for more workers in equilibrium. This then leads to a 
decrease in labor market tightness and a reduction in wages paid. This change in labor market tightness is 
not present in the case with frictionless labor markets because the unemployment rate is always zero. This 
explains why the job creation curve is horizontal when labor markets are frictionless. 
38 When vacancies are scarce, being a worker in an economy where jobs are endogenously destroyed is less 
attractive to the agent because he may spend a long period of time unemployed if he is laid off. This makes 
being an entrepreneur more attractive as compared to the case when jobs are not endogenously destroyed 
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frictionless labor markets, wages are higher with disembodied technological change: 
ceteris paribus, being an entrepreneur is more profitable when technological change is 
disembodied, which increases the number of vacancies, leading to higher wages 
compared to the case with embodied technological change. 
 
Figure 3.1: The Entrepreneurship and Job Creation Curves when the Labor Market is 
Frictionless 
 
Technological growth affects entrepreneurship via three mechanisms. First, there is the 
capitalization effect, which operates through the effective discount rate h,  ,. 
Second, there is the firm size effect, which operates through changes in the number of 
worker an entrepreneur can manage, namely ,. Finally, there is the employment 
duration effect, which operates through the optimal duration of a job T§ and is only 
                                                                                                                                                 
(i.e., when technological change is disembodied). Therefore, when the ratio of vacancies to unemployment 
















present when technological change is embodied. 
     
Figure 3.2: The Entrepreneurship and Job Creation Curves with Labor Market Frictions 
 
 
        With frictionless labor markets, the proportion of entrepreneurs is solely determined 
by the position of the job creation curve. Given that neither the capitalization effect nor 
the employment duration effect influences the location of the job creation curve, it is only 
the firm size effect that matters. Therefore, technological growth affects the number of 
entrepreneurs if and only if growth affects the number of worker an entrepreneur can 
manage, i.e. ª, « 0. If technological growth enhances entrepreneurial ability at 
managing workers, i.e. ª,  0, then a higher growth rate shifts the job creation curve 
upward, leading to a reduction in the number of entrepreneurs. The opposite occurs when 
ª,  0. 




















entrepreneurs is no longer determined by the position of one of the curves. In some cases 
the overall effect of technological growth on entrepreneurship can be easily determined, 
while in others the overall effect depends on how the elasticity of the entrepreneurship 
curve compares to that of the job creation curve. To illustrate the three mechanisms in the 
presence of labor market frictions, we shut down two at a time to study how the third 
operates. 
    Suppose only the capitalization effect is present, i.e. technological change is 
disembodied and entrepreneurial ability is independent of growth, ª,  0. Then the 
capitalization effect does not influence the location of the the job creation curve. Suppose 
the agent's effective discount rate h,  , is increasing in the growth rate, hª,  1. 
Then an increase in growth makes increases the effective discount rate. This makes being 
an entrepreneur less attractive given that an entrepreneur has to incur initial sunk costs. 
The entrepreneurship curve thereby shifts to the left, decreasing the number of 
entrepreneurs (see Figure 3.3)39 The opposite occurs when hª,  1. 
    Suppose only the firm size effect is present, i.e. technological change is disembodied 
and the effective discount rate is independent of growth, hª,  1. If ª,  0, an 
increase in the rate of technological growth shifts the entrepreneurship curve to the right 
and the job creation curve upward. The opposite is true when ª,  0. The 
entrepreneurship curve shifts to the right when ª,  0 because, all else equal, the 
higher , is, the more workers an entrepreneur can manage. This increases the value of 
being an entrepreneur and reduces the threshold ability for any given level of labor 
                                                 
39 Figure 3 (as well as in the remaining figures in this paper) has labor market tightness in the horizontal 
axis, and not wages as in Figure 1 and 2. Having labor market tightness is more convient because wages are 
a function of labor market tightness in equilibrium when labor market frictions are present. We use wages 
instead in Figure 1 and 2 because labor market tightness is not defined in the frictionless labor market case. 
This is because both vacancies and unemployment are zero, so their ratio is not defined. 
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market tightness. The job creation curve shifts upward when ª,  0 because, for any 
given reservation ability, entrepreneurs now create more jobs. This leads to higher levels 
of vacancies, which explains the direction of the shift. Given that both curves shift in 
different directions, the overall effect of the impact of an increase in technological growth 
on entrepreneurship cannot be determined unless parameters values are assumed. The 
overall effect depends on the elasticities of the entrepreneurship and job creation curves 
together with the extent to which a change in entrepreneurial ability , causes shifts in 
both curves. The greater is the elasticity of the entrepreneurship curve relative to that of 
the job creation curve, the more likely it is that the number of entrepreneurs decreases in 
response to an increase in growth (see Figure 3.4). 
     
Figure 3.3: The Impact of Technological Growth on Entrepreneurship when only the 














Figure 3.4: The Impact of Technological Growth on Entrepreneurship when only the 
Firm Size Effect is Present and A′(g)>0. 
     
    Suppose only the employment duration effect is present, i.e. technological change is 
embodied, the effective discount rate is independent of growth, hª,  1, and 
entrepreneurial ability is independent of growth, ª,  0. An increase in the rate of 
technological growth shifts the entrepreneurship curve inward because, for any given 
level of labor market tightness, the increase in the rate of technological growth reduces 
the optimal job destruction age, which in turns reduces the value of being an 
entrepreneur. Meanwhile, the job creation curve rotates around ¥  1 when the optimal 
duration decreases, with the new job creation curve being above (below) the previous one 
if ¥  1 (¥ >1, respectively).40 These changes in the entrepreneurship and job creation 
curves imply that an increase in technological growth has a negative impact on 
                                                 
40 The reason why the job creation curve rotates around ¥ =1 is explained on page 119, in the second 












entrepreneurship when the ratio of vacancies to unemployment is less than one (see 
Figure 3.5). When the ratio of vacancies to unemployment is greater than one, the impact 
of enhanced growth on entrepreneurship depends once again on the elasticities of the 
entrepreneurship and job creation curves together with the extent to which a change in 
entrepreneurial ability , causes shifts in both curves.     
 
Figure 3.5: The Impact of Technological Growth on Entrepreneurship when only the 
Employment Duration Effect is Present 
 
    We next provide an overview of the ways in which technological growth affects 
unemployment. According to equation (6), unemployment is sensitive to changes in the 
threshold level of ability beyond which agents become entrepreneurs, labor market 
tightness ¥, and the optimal duration of a job T§. The impact of growth on unemployment 
that operates via changes in  is labeled the composition effect, that which operates via 












creative destruction effect. Figure 3.6 illustrates the three effects.  
 
Figure 3.6: The Impact of Technological Growth on Unemployment 
 
The curve Δ
  0 consists of the combinations of the reservation ability and labor 
market tightness that can sustain the current level of unemployment, given the optimal 
duration of a job. An increase in the growth rate shifts the Δ
  0 curve down if 
technological change is embodied.41 Starting from a point on the Δ
  0 curve, both an 
increase in the reservation ability (moving upward along the vertical axis) and a decrease 
in labor market tightness (moving left along the horizontal axis) lead to an increase in 
unemployment. A decrease in the job destruction age also makes a hike in unemployment 
more likely in response to an increase in growth. 
                                                 
41 When the technological change in embodied, an increase in the growth rate leads to a decrease in the 
optimal job destruction age. If the labor market tightness and the reservation ability were to remain 
constant, unemployment would increase in equilibrium. For unemploment to remain constaint, either the 
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∆u = 0 
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    To summarize, our model suggests that technological growth may affect 
entrepreneurship and unemployment in any fashion. Table 3.1 and 3.2 provide an 
overview of the mechanisms by which the growth rate affects entrepreneurship and 
unemployment. In the absence of the firm size effect, entrepreneurship and 
unemployment tend to move in opposite directions. For example, an increase in the 
number of entrepreneurs leads to an increase in labor market tightness, which reduces 
unemployment. Entrepreneurship and unemployment move in the same direction if there 
is a sufficiently strong firm size effect. When the firm size effect is strong enough, a 
decrease in the number of entrepreneurs no longer immediately translates into a decrease 
in labor market tightness: because entrepreneurs can create more jobs when growth 
enhances entrepreneurial ability, ª,  0, labor market tightness can increase even if 
the number of entrepreneurs is lower. This scenario is also likely when the job creation 
curve is very elastic. 
     
Table 3.1: The Mechanisms by which Technological Growth Affects Entrepreneurship. 
Effects Relating to the Impact of Technological Growth on Entrepreneurship 
Name Source Effect Positive if 
Capitalization Effective discount rate Effective Discount Rate is 
Increasing in Growth 
Firm Size Entrepreneurial ability Growth Enhances 
Entrepreneurial Ability 





Table 3.2: The Mechanisms by which Technological Growth Affects Unemployment. 
Effects Relating to the Impact of Technological Growth on Unemployment 
Name Source Effect Positive if 




Job Creation Changes in Labor Market Tightness Growth Decreases Labor Market 
Tightness 
Creative Destruction Optimal Job Destruction Age Technological Growth is 
Embodied 
 
    We now proceed with studying analytically in detail the impact of technological 
growth on entrepreneurship and unemployment when labor markets are frictionless. We 
then examine the cases in which there are labor market frictions. 
 
3. Frictionless Labor Markets 
3.1. Disembodied Technological Change 
    An individual chooses the occupation that maximizes the present discounted value of 
future income. An agent with entrepreneurial ability  can either become an entrepreneur 
that creates , jobs, or a worker that gets the wage O[. In the entrepreneurial 
occupation, the expected payoff to the individual is  ,[  `[, which equals 
the total expected profit of creating , new jobs minus the business start-up cost 
`[. The payoff of becoming a worker is N[. Entrepreneurs are therefore those 
whose ability  satisfies the inequality 
3.7                                           ,[  `[ 0 N[ 
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The value of being a worker solves the asset pricing equation 
3.8                                           h,N[  O[ 7 N­ [ 
where a dot on top of a value function refers to the derivative with respect to time. The 
value of creating a job is given by 
3.9                                            [  o[  `[ 
where o[ is the value to the entrepreneur of a filled job position. Jobs are subject to 
separation shocks, which follow a Poisson process with arrival rate δ. Given these 
exogenous separations shocks, o[is the solution to the following asset pricing equation: 
3.10                        h,o[  `[a  O[  'o[  [( 7 o­[ 
where `[a is the output generated from a match. 
    In what follows, we focus our attention on the balanced growth path, along which O[ 
grows at the rate g, as do o[ and N[. Thus, we have that o[  `[o, N[ 
`[N, and O[  `[O, where 
3.11                                                       N  Oh,  , 
and 
3.12                                                     o  a  O  .h,  ,  
The value of creating a job can thereby be written as 
3.13                                                     a  O  .h,  ,   
    Given that V and W are independent of α, the occupational choice decision is governed 
by a reservation entrepreneurial ability , such that an agent with ability α becomes an 
entrepreneur if α 0 , otherwise he becomes a worker. The reservation ability satisfies 
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3.14                                                           N 7 ,  
Replacing equations (3.11) and (3.13) into equation (3.14), we find that 
3.15                                       O 7 h,  ,,'a  O  . 7 h,  ,( 
For the labor market to be in equilibrium, the number of workers in the economy  
must equal the number of jobs created by entrepreneurs, '1  (,α|α 0 . 
The labor market clearing condition can then be written as 
3.16                                            , ¡ ¢£¤ T 
Note that the system of equations that characterize the equilibrium is block recursive. 
Equation (16) uniquely determines the threshold ability . Knowing , equation (15) 
uniquely determines the wage O.42  The following proposition describes the impact of 
growth on entrepreneurship. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose technological growth is disembodied and the labor market is 
frictionless. An increase in the growth rate reduces the number of entrepreneurs if and 
only if growth enhances entrepreneurial ability, i.e. ª,  0. 
PROOF: Immediate from (16). 
 
    Technological growth dampens the extent of entrepreneurship if and only if an increase 
in growth enhances entrepreneurial ability at managing workers. The intuition of this 
result follows from equation (16). When the labor market is frictionless, there are no 
                                                 
42 Specifically, we have that O  35 'a  . 7 h,  ,(  °2{235 . 
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unemployed workers or unfilled vacancies in equilibrium. The number of entrepreneurs is 
then given by the minimum number of entrepreneurs that are needed to create enough 
jobs for the workers in the economy. The sign of A′(g) plays an important role in 
determining the impact of technological growth on entrepreneurship because it captures 
whether more or less entrepreneurs are needed to hire all the workers when growth is 
augmented. Given that fewer entrepreneurs are needed to hire the workers when A′(g)>0, 
the number of entrepreneurs in equilibrium decreases in response to an increase in 
growth. The opposite occurs when ª,  0. If ª,  0, then changes in the growth 
rate have no effect on the number of entrepreneurs. Finally, note that to obtain this result, 
no restrictions on the interest rate h, are required. 
 
3.2. Embodied Technological Change 
    When technological change is embodied, only the productivity of new jobs grows at 
the exogenous rate g. Once a job is created, its productivity remains fixed for the duration 
of the match. Given that labor markets are competitive, wages paid by entrepreneurs 
follow the course of productivity growth very closely.43  Technological change causes 
wages to grow over time, even if the productivity of the job remains fixed. As a result, 
the match eventually becomes unprofitable for the entrepreneur. Once that point is 
reached, the entrepreneur destroys the job and lays off the worker. 
    The difference between embodied and disembodied technological change is that now 
the value of being a worker might depend on the date the job was created, given that not 
all jobs are equally productive. The value to a worker of being employed at time t in a job 
                                                 
43 Entrepreneurs do not pay workers their marginal product because they need to recuperate the business 
start-up cost and cover the opportunity cost of being an entrepreneur. 
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created at time τ is the solution to the following functional equation: 
3.17      h,N[, ±  >4?EO[, ± 7 .'N[, [  N[, ±( 7 N­ [, ±, h,N[, [F 
where O[, ± is the wage paid at time t to a worker that joined the entrepreneur at time ±. 
The max operator indicates that workers can move instantaneously at no cost between 
jobs. This assumption implies that workers must be indifferent between all jobs. That is, 
N[, ±  N[, [, which in turn implies that wages in all jobs have to be equal, i.e. 
O[, ±  O[, [. Equation (17) can then be written as 
3.18                                          h,N[  O[ 7 N­ [ 
    As before, the value of being an entrepreneur is given by  
<, [  ,[  `[ 
and the value of having a vacant job can be written as 
3.19                                        [  o[, [  `[ 
where o[, [ is the value to an entrepreneur of a recently filled job. The value to an 
entrepreneur of a filled job at date t which was created at time ±, o[, ±, is given by 
3.20     h,o[, ±  >4?E`±a  O[, ± 7 .'[  o[, ±( 7 o­[, ±, h,[F 
where `±a is the output generated from a match created at time . 
    Finally, we specify how entrepreneurs choose the age at which a job is destroyed. The 
value to the entrepreneur of a filled job position can be written as 
3.21   o[, ±  max²
UV
W
VX ¡ '`±a  O[, ±(!{°25³{	Tb	5²	




where the first term captures the expected present discounted value of future profits 
generated by a filled job, while the last two terms capture the expected continuation value 
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of a vacant job.44 
    In what follows, we focus our attention on the balanced growth path. Given that wages 
and asset prices grow at the same rate along the balanced growth path, the value of being 
a worker and the value of posting a vacancy can be written as 
3.22                                        h,N  O 7 ,N  
3.23                                          o0    
The problem of finding the optimal age at which to destroy a job, ¦§, can be expressed as 
3.24                      o  max²
UV
W
VX ¡'`±a  O±(!{°25³	T[²




where `± and O± represent the productivity and the wage paid by a job ± created 
periods ago. 
The optimal duration of a job is a decreasing function of the growth rate g. This is so 
because while the expected present discounted value of future profits generated by a 
filled job (the first term in equation (3.24) is decreasing in g, the expected continuation 
value of a vacant job (the last two terms in equation (3.24) is increasing in g. 
    As before, two equations play a key role in the solution of the model. First, for the 
labor market to be in equilibrium, the number of workers in the economy  must 
equal the number of jobs created by entrepreneurs, [1  (,| 0 . The 
labor market clearing condition is therefore the same as in the case with disembodied 
technological change: 
                                                 
44 When the optimal age at which a job is destroyed is infinity, the value to the entrepreneur of a filled job 
position in the case with embodied technological change coincides with the value to the entrepreneur of a 
filled job position in the case with disembodied technological, which was defined in equation (3.10) 
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3.25                                            , ¡ ¢£¤ T 
Second, there is the occupational choice decision, which is characterized by the 
reservation entrepreneurial ability , such that an agent with ability  becomes an 
entrepreneur if  0 , otherwise he becomes a worker. The reservation ability satisfies 
3.26                                                           N 7 ,  
    The following proposition describes the impact of technological growth on 
entrepreneurship. 
 
PROPOSTION 2: Suppose technological growth is embodied and the labor market is 
frictionless. An increase in the growth rate reduces the number of entrepreneurs if and 
only if growth enhances entrepreneurial ability, i.e. ª,  0. 
PROOF: Immediate from (3.25). 
 
    As in the case with disembodied technological change, growth dampens 
entrepreneurship if and only if an increase in growth enhances entrepreneurial ability at 
managing workers. The same intuition follows through, so it is not repeated. 
 
4. Labor Market Frictions 
    Suppose the labor market is burdened by frictions that prevent entrepreneurs from 
finding workers and workers from finding jobs. In order to find workers, entrepreneurs 
post vacancies and workers search for jobs. Only unemployed workers can search for 
jobs and the search process is random in the sense that they cannot target their search to a 
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particular vacancy. The cost to entrepreneurs of posting a vacancy is `[ per vacancy. 
While considering whether to post a vacancy, entrepreneurs compare the expected future 
profit with the cost of posting a vacancy. 
    The number of jobs that are filled at a given point in time is summarized by a matching 
function > , 
, where v is the number of vacancies and u is the number of unemployed 
workers, both expressed in terms of the fixed labor force. The matching function >⋅ is 
increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree 1 in vacancies and unemployment. 
Once a match has been formed, wages paid by entrepreneurs to workers are determined 
via Nash bargaining, where the worker's bargaining power is denoted by . Wages can be 
recontracted at any point in time, at no cost. Entrepreneur-worker matches are subject to 
separation shocks, which follow a Poisson process with arrival rate δ. Matches can also 
be endogenously destroyed if the match is no longer profitable. 
 
4.1. Disembodied Technological Change 
    The value of becoming an entrepreneur at time t for an agent with entrepreneurial 
ability , <, [, is given by 
3.27                                                <, [  ,[  `[ 
where [ is the value of creating a new vacancy at date t and p(t)K is the cost of 
starting a business. Vt is the solution to the following asset pricing equation: 
3.28                                h,[  %¥'o[  [(  `[ 7 ­ [ 
where ¥ z v/u is labor market tightness, %¥ z > , 
/  is the probability of 
filling the vacancy, p(t)c is the cost of posting a vacancy, and o[ is the value to an 
entrepreneur of having a filled job at time t. o[ solves the asset pricing equation 
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3.29             h,o[  >4?»`[a  O[ 7 .[  o[ 7 o­[, h,[¼ 
where `[a is the output generated from a match, O[ is the wage paid at time t to the 
worker, and the max operator in equation (29) captures the fact that the job is destroyed 
once the value of the filled job falls below that of a vacant job. The value of being a 
worker, W(t), is the solution to the following asset pricing equation: 
3.30           h,N[  >4?EO[  'N[  8[( 7 N­ [, h,8[F 
The max operator in equation (3.30) allows the worker to quit his job to become 
unemployed. Finally, the value of being unemployed, U(t), solves 
3.31                       h,8[  `[/ 7 %¥'N[  8[( 7 8­ [ 
    As before, given that the value of being an entrepreneur is increasing in ability α, while 
the value of being a worker is independent of α, the choice of whether to become an 
entrepreneur can be characterized by a reservation entrepreneurial ability . That is, an 
agent with entrepreneurial ability  becomes an entrepreneur if  0 , otherwise he 
becomes a worker. The reservation ability is given by 
3.32                                                        8[ 7 `[,[  
One can show that 
d½½  0 and ¾½½  0, which by equation (32) implies that the 
extent of entrepreneurship is decreasing in labor market tightness, 
½  0. Intuitively, 
when labor market tightness is higher, it becomes more difficult for entrepreneurs to fill 
their vacancies, while it becomes easier for unemployed workers to find jobs. Therefore, 
more agents become workers and fewer become entrepreneurs in response to an increase 
in labor market tightness. 
    In what follows, we focus our attention on the balanced growth path, along which labor 
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market tightness ¥ is constant. Given that ¥ is fixed, wages are set via Nash bargaining, 
and labor productivity and all costs grow at the same rate g, one can show that o[, [, 
N[ and 8[ also grow at the rate g. The implications are that these value functions 
can be written as o[  `[o, [  `[, N[  `[N, and 8[  `[8. 
Hence, along the balanced growth path, equations (3.28), (3.29), (3.30), and (3.31) can be 
written as 
3.33                                h,  ,  %¥'o  (   
3.34                    h,  ,o  >4?Ea  O 7 .  o, h,  ,F 
3.35                    h,  ,N  >4?EO  .'N  8(, h,  ,8F 
3.36                                h,  ,8  / 7 %¥'N  8( 
 
4.1.1. Labor Market Flows 
    Given the reservation ability , the number of entrepreneurs is given by 1  . 
Because entrepreneurs find it optimal to create jobs up to their entrepreneurial ability, the 
total number of jobs created is 
3.37                                          _ 7    , ¡ ¢£¤ T 
where n is the number of filled jobs and v is the number of vacant jobs. The 
unemployment rate is the difference between the total number of workers minus the 
number of filled jobs: 
3.38                                                         
    _ 
    To determine how employment evolves, one can examine employment from the 
entrepreneur's or worker's perspective. From the entrepreneur's perspective, given that 
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vacancies are filled with probability %¥ and filled jobs are destroyed with probability ., 
employment evolves according to 
3.39                              _­  %¥ ¿, ¡ ¢£¤ T  _À  ._ 
where the term in brackets is the number of vacancies. In terms of the worker's transition 
rates, given that unemployed workers find jobs with probability ¥%¥ and employed 
workers lose their jobs with probability ., employment evolves according to 
3.40                                     _­  ¥%¥'  _(  ._ 
where the term in brackets is the number of unemployed workers. 
    Combining equations (39) and (40), and evaluating n at its steady-state value, one can 
show that along a balanced growth path the following relation between reservation ability 
and labor market tightness is satisfied: 
3.41                                      , ¡ 
¢£¤
 T 
.¥ 7 ¥%¥. 7 ¥%¥  
Finally, replacing the steady-state value of employment into equation (38), one can show 
that the proportion of unemployed workers in the steady state is given by 
3.42                                              
       .. 7 ¥%¥ 
 
4.1.2. Equilibrium 
      Equilibrium can be summarized by a system of two equations in two unknowns. 
These equations are: 
3.43                                                       8¥ 7 ,¥ 
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3.44                              , ¡ 
¢£¤
 T   
.¥ 7 ¥%¥. 7 ¥%¥  
where 8¥ and ¥ are 
3.45     8¥   /h,  , 7  %¥'a  / 7 (h,  ,'1  %¥ 7 h,  , 7 . 7 ¥%¥( 
3.46              ¥   1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 ¥%¥(ch,  ,'1  %¥ 7 h,  , 7 . 7 ¥%¥( 
    The unknowns in the system of equations are labor market tightness ¥ and the 
entrepreneurial ability threshold . With knowledge of ¥ and , the following are 
uniquely determined: the number of entrepreneurs 1  , the number of employed 
workers 1    
, and total unemployment (3.42). This system of two equations can 
be represented graphically as in Fonseca et al. (2001). One can show that equation (43), 
which we refer to as the entrepreneurship curve, is upward sloping in ¥- space, while 
equation (3.34), which we refer to as the job creation curve, is downward sloping in ¥- 
space (see Figure 3.3).45 
    With labor market frictions and disembodied technological change, growth affects 
entrepreneurship via two mechanisms. The first mechanism operates through the 
entrepreneur's effective discount rate R(g)-g. The impact of growth on the effective 
discount rate is relevant because the costs of creating a job are paid initially, while the 
benefits accrue in the future. Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1999) find a similar mechanism while studying the effect of growth on unemployment, 
which they label the capitalization effect of growth. Faster technological progress has 
both a direct effect on the effective discount rate and an indirect effect through changes in 
                                                 
45 The intuition for the slopes of these curves can be found in footnotes 33 and 34. 
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the interest rate. While the direct effect reduces the effective discount rate, the indirect 
effect can either increase or decrease the effective discount rate depending on the sign of 
R′(g). The net effect is such that a higher rate of technological growth increases the 
effective discount rate if and only if R′(g)>1. 
    The second mechanism operates via the ability of entrepreneurs to create jobs, which 
we label the firm size effect of growth. Recall that the maximum number of workers an 
entrepreneur can manage is αA(g). Hence, all else being equal, the greater is A(g), the 
higher is the value of being an entrepreneur. However, an increase in A(g) might not 
result in more entrepreneurship because when A(g) is greater, each entrepreneur creates 
more jobs, which leads to higher wages in equilibrium. 
    The following proposition derives the ways in which entrepreneurship and 
unemployment depend on the exogenous growth rate when the firm size effect is absent. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose technological growth is disembodied, there are labor market 
frictions, and the firm size effect is absent, i.e. entrepreneurial ability is independent of 
growth, A′(g)=0. An increase in the growth rate reduces the number of entrepreneurs and 
increases the number of unemployed workers if and only if the effective discount rate is 
increasing in growth, R′(g)>1. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
 
    Whether R′(g) is smaller or greater than 1 is crucial because it determines the direction 
of the capitalization effect of growth. When R′(g)>1, the effective discount rate is higher 
the greater is the growth rate. This makes creating jobs less profitable, decreasing the 
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value of being an entrepreneur. 
    The impact of technological growth on entrepreneurship and unemployment is 
illustrated in Figure 3.3, which considers the case in which R′(g)>1. From equation (43), 
we infer that a higher growth rate decreases the threshold ability  at all levels of labor 
market tightness θ (i.e., it shifts the entrepreneurship curve up) if and only if R′(g)>1. 
Meanwhile, the growth rate does not influence the job creation curve. Therefore, when 
the growth rate is elevated,  is higher and θ is lower if and only if R′(g)>1. 
    When the effective discount rate is increasing in growth, R′(g)>1, the unemployment 
rate is increasing in growth due to two effects that operate in the same direction. First, 
because fewer workers become entrepreneurs (in response to the increase in g when 
R′(g)>1), the increase in the number of agents becoming workers increases 
unemployment since there are more agents searching for jobs. We previously labeled this 
mechanism the composition effect, which is reflected in equation (42) by a higher F(). 
The second reason why the unemployment rate is higher is that the decrease in the 
number of entrepreneurs (brought about by the increase in g when R′(g)>1) decreases job 
creation, so it becomes more difficult for workers to find jobs. We previously labeled this 
mechanism the job creation effect, which is reflected in equation (42) by a lower θq(θ). 
    The following proposition derives the ways in which entrepreneurship depends on the 
exogenous growth rate when the capitalization effect is absent. To simplify the 
exposition, define cÂ, θ|Ã  and cÂ, θ|ÄÅ as the elasticities with respect to labor market 
tightness of the reservation ability along the entrepreneurship and job creation curves, 




PROPOSTION 4: Suppose technological growth is disembodied, there are labor market 
frictions, and the capitalization effect is absent, i.e. the effective discount rate is 
independent of growth, R′(g)=1. The number of entrepreneurs is decreasing in the growth 
rate g if growth enhances entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)>0, and 
3.47                                       cÂ, ¥|ÃcÂ, ¥|ÄÅ    Ç1  Æ 7   \  
or if growth dampens entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)<0, and 
3.48                                       cÂ, ¥|ÃcÂ, ¥|ÄÅ   Ç1  Æ 7   \  
Otherwise, the number of entrepreneurs is increasing in the growth rate g. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
     
    The elasticities of the entrepreneurship and job creation curves are relevant because a 
change in the growth rate has direct and indirect effects that operate in opposite 
directions. When technological growth enhances entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)>0, the 
value of being an entrepreneur increases at all levels of labor market tightness ¥  because 
entrepreneurs can now manage more workers in response to an increase in growth. 
However, the increase in the number of jobs leads to a reduction in unemployment, which 
has a negative effect on entrepreneurship both through higher wages and a lower 
probability of filling vacancies. Whether the direct or indirect effect dominates depends 
on how sensitive job creation and entrepreneurship are to labor market tightness. The 
more sensitive the decision to become an entrepreneur is to labor market tightness, the 
stronger is the indirect effect and the more likely it becomes that the number of 
entrepreneurs is reduced when the growth rate increases (see Figure 3.7). 
 
     
 
Figure 3.7: The Impact of
Firm Size Effect is Present and A
    
 A simple back of the envelope calculation suggests that the impact of technological 
growth on entrepreneurship is negative when the capitalization effec
A′(g)>0, entrepreneurial ability is uniformly distributed and 10% of agents in the 
economy are employers, i.e. 
employment, each entrepreneur must hire 9 workers on average. S
are labor market frictions, the average ability of an entrepreneur is 
reservation ability is  =9
(47) is (9²/(0.1§9.5))+1 =
entrepreneurial ability distribution, the elasticity of the reservation ability along the 
                                                
46 Note that  when the distribution is uniform and the minimum of the support of the distribution 
function equals 0. 
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t is absent. Suppose 
=0.1. Without labor market frictions, to obtain full 
uppose that when there 
=9.5
. Then, we have that term on the right hand side of inequality 




 and the 
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entrepreneurship curve  cÂ, ¥|Ã has to be considerably larger than that along the job 
creation curve cÂ, ¥|ÄÅ for higher growth to enhance entrepreneurship. 
    The following proposition derives the way in which unemployment depends on the 
exogenous growth rate when the capitalization effect is absent. For convenience, let 
È¥ z ¥%¥ denote the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job. 
 
PROPOSITON 5:  Suppose technological growth is disembodied, there are labor market 
frictions, and the capitalization effect is absent, i.e. the effective discount rate is 
independent of growth, R′(g)=1. The number of unemployed workers is decreasing in the 
growth rate g if growth enhances entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)>0, and 
3.49      . 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cÂ, ¥|ÄÅ 7 , Æ@1  A cÂ, ¥|Ã
 ,ÈÊ¥¥\'. 7 È¥(  Ì 7 p1 7 \ q Æ@1  AÍ 
or if growth dampens entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)<0, and 
3.50      . 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cÂ, ¥|ÄÅ 7 , Æ@1  A cÂ, ¥|Ã
 ,ÈÊ¥¥\'. 7 È¥(  Ì 7 p1 7 \ q Æ@1  AÍ 
Otherwise, the number of unemployed workers is increasing in the growth rate g. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
     
    Condition (49) is easier to interpret when expressed in term of equilibrium changes in 
the reservation ability and labor market tightness: 
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3.51                                                  TT,  .ÈÊ¥'. 7 È¥(Ç T¥T, 
The left hand side is the composition effect and the right hand side is the job creation 
effect. One can show that labor market tightness is increasing in the growth rate, 
Î½Î2  0, 
when growth enhances entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)>0 . If the extent of entrepreneurship 
is increasing in growth, 
ÎÎ2  0, then condition (3.51) is immediately satisfied. This arises 
because, in this scenario, the composition and job creation effects operate in the same 
direction. The increase in the number of entrepreneurs reduces the number of workers, 
which in turn reduces unemployment at any level of labor market tightness. The increase 
in labor market tightness also reduces unemployment since it becomes easier for workers 
to find jobs. It is only in the case when the composition and job creation effects operate in 
different directions (for example, as arises when  
ÎÎ2  0) that further conditions are 
required for growth to have a negative effect on unemployment. When 
ÎÎ2 and Î½Î2 are both 
positive, the increase in the number of workers raises unemployment but the increase in 
labor market tightness reduces unemployment. The condition (49) limits how much 
entrepreneurship can change in comparison to labor market tightness, to ensure a 
decrease in unemployment in response to an increase in growth. 
    The following proposition derives the ways in which entrepreneurship and 
unemployment depend on the growth rate when both the capitalization and firm size 
effects are present. 
 
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose technological growth is disembodied and there are labor 
market frictions. The number of entrepreneurs is decreasing in the growth rate g if growth 
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enhances entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)>0, and 
3.52                                       cÂ, ¥|ÃcÂ, ¥|ÄÅ   Ψ É Ç1  Æ 7   \ Ë 
or if growth dampens entrepreneurial ability, A′(g)<0, and 
3.53                                       cÂ, ¥|ÃcÂ, ¥|ÄÅ  Ψ É Ç1  Æ 7   \ Ë 
where Ð z 1  °Ê2{3'Ñ25Ò5Ó(ÑÊ2'3{Ôl½'Õ{Ò({'°2{25³5Ô½(( .  Otherwise, the number of 
entrepreneurs is increasing in the growth rate g. 
The number of unemployed workers is decreasing in g if A′(g)>0 and 
3.54      . 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cÂ, ¥|ÄÅ 7 , Æ@1  A cÂ, ¥|Ã
 ,ÈÊ¥¥\'. 7 È¥(  Ì 7 p1 7 Ð \ q Æ@1  AÍ 
or if A′(g)<0 and 
3.55      . 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cÂ, ¥|ÄÅ 7 , Æ@1  A cÂ, ¥|Ã
 ,ÈÊ¥¥\'. 7 È¥(  Ì 7 p1 7 Ð \ q Æ@1  AÍ 
Otherwise, the number of unemployed workers is increasing in g. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
 
        The proposition is similar in format to the one obtained when only the firm size 
effect is present. Once we allow for the capitalization effect to be present, it makes 
having a positive impact of growth on entrepreneurship less (more) likely when the 
effective discount rate is increasing (decreasing) in the growth rate, R′(g)>(<)1. 
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Similarly, a negative (positive) capitalization effect makes having a negative (positive) 
impact of growth on unemployment less (more) likely. The intuition is that a negative 
capitalization effect reduces the value of being an entrepreneur when R′(g)>1, which 
translates into lower entrepreneurship and higher unemployment. 
4.2. Embodied Technological Change 
    When technological change is embodied, only the productivity of new jobs grows at 
the exogenous rate g. Once a job is created, its productivity remains constant for the 
duration of the match. The value of being an entrepreneur is still given by <, [ 
,[  `[ and the value of creating a new vacancy at date t is the solution to the 
following asset pricing equation: 
3.56                               h,[  %¥'o[, [  [(  `[ 7 ­ [ 
where o[, ± is the value at time t of a filled job that was created at time ±. o[, ± solves 
the asset pricing equation 
3.57        h,o[, ±  >4?»`±a  O[, ± 7 .[  o[,  7 o­[, , h,[¼ 
where `±a is the output produced by a worker that was matched to the entrepreneur at 
time `±a, and O[, ± is the wage paid at time t to that same worker. The max operator 
in equation (57) captures the fact that the job is destroyed once the value of the filled job 
is lower than that of having a vacant job. 
    The value to a worker of being employed in a job that started producing at time  solves 
3.58     h,N[, ±  >4?»O[, ±  .N[, ±  8[ 7 N­ [, ±, h,8[¼ 
The max operator in equation (3.58) allows the worker to quit his job to become 
unemployed, which has value U(t). The value of being unemployed solves 
3.59                           h,8[  `[/ 7 %¥'N[, [  8[( 7 8­ [ 
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    All jobs are eventually destroyed, either exogenously or endogenously. Endogenous 
destruction occurs because wages are determined via Nash bargaining, taking into 
account the employer's and worker's options to continue searching. Since the wages of 
new jobs grow over time due to technological change, the value of searching for a new 
job also rises over time. This causes wages in existing jobs to grow over time.47 
Entrepreneurs choose the age at which to destroy a job by maximizing the value of a job 
position with respect to job duration. The maximal value of a job position can be written 
as 
3.60   o[, ±  max²
UV
W
VX ¡ '`±a  O[, ±(!{°25³{	Tb	5²	




where the first term captures the expected present discounted value of future profits 
generated by a filled job, while the last two terms capture the expected continuation value 
of a vacant job.48 
    As before, an agent with ability  becomes an entrepreneur if  0 , otherwise he 
becomes a worker, where 
3.61                                                        8[ 7 `[,[  
    We once again focus on the balanced growth path, along which we have o[, ± 
`[o±, [  `[, N[, ±  `[N±, and 8[  `[8. o± is the value 
along the balanced growth path of a job position that was created  periods ago. Similarly, 
                                                 
47 One can show that, along the balanced growth path, wages are established according to w[, ± `±a 7 `['1  / 7 ¥ 7 '¥  1(6  ,(. 
48 When the optimal age at which a job is destroyed is infinity, the value to the entrepreneur of a filled job 
position in the case with embodied technological change coincides with the value to the entrepreneur of a 
filled job position in the case with disembodied technological, which was defined in equation (3.29). 
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N± is the value along the balanced growth path of being a worker in a job that was 
created ± periods ago. Equations (56) through (59) can then be written as 
3.62                                        h,  ,  %¥'o  (   
3.63  h,o±  >4? Ö`±a  O± 7 .  o± 7 T'`[o±(T[ , h,× 
3.64     h,N±  >4? ÖO±  .N±  8 7 T'`[N±(T[ , h,8× 
3.65                              h,  ,8  / 7 %¥'N0  8( 
where `± is the productivity of a job that was created  periods ago and O± is the 
wage paid to a worker that was matched to the entrepreneur  periods ago. 
    Finally, the problem of solving for the optimal duration of a job ¦§ can be expressed as 
3.66                      o  max²
UV
W
VX ¡'`±a  O[, ±(!{°25³	T[²




The optimal duration of a job is decreasing in the growth rate g: the expected present 
discounted value of future profits generated by a filled job (the first term in equation (66) 
is decreasing in g, but the expected continuation value of a vacant job (the last two terms 
in equation (66) is increasing in g. 
 
4.2.1. Labor Market Flows 
    The difference with respect to the case in which technology is disembodied arises from 
flows into unemployment. When technological change is disembodied, jobs are destroyed 
only when they experience an exogenous destruction shock. When technological change 
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is embodied, jobs are also destroyed when they reach their age of obsolescence. 
    The total number of jobs created is 
3.67                                                _ 7     , ¡ ¢£¤ T 
and the unemployment rate is 
3.68                                               
    _  
    The evolution of employment can be written from the entrepreneur's perspective: 
_­  %¥ ¿, ¡ ¢£¤ T  _À  ._  exp .¦§%¥ ¿, ¡ 
¢£¤
 T  _À 
where the first term is the number of vacancies that are filled (which equals the number 
of vacancies times the vacancy filling rate), the second term is the number of jobs that are 
exogenously destroyed, and the last term is the number of jobs that are endogenously 
destroyed. This last expression can be re-stated as 
3.69                        _­  1  !xp .¦§%¥ ¿, ¡ ¢£¤ T  _À  ._ 
In terms of a worker's transition rates, the evolution of employment can be written 
                             _­  ¥%¥'  _(  ._  exp .¦§¥%¥'  _( 
where the first term is the number of workers that find a job (which equals the number of 
unemployed workers times the job finding rate). The second and third terms are the 
number of workers that exogenously and endogenously lose their jobs, respectively. This 
last expression can be re-stated as 
3.70                        _­  1  !xp .¦§¥%¥'  _(  ._ 
Combining equations (69) and (<70), and evaluating at the steady state, we find 
119 
 
3.71                          , ¡ 
¢£¤
 T   
.¥ 7 '1  !xp .¦§(¥%¥. 7 '1  !xp .¦§(¥%¥  
Finally, replacing the steady state level of employment into equation (68), one can show 
that the proportion of unemployed workers in the steady state is given by\ 
3.72                                               
   .. 7 '1  !xp .¦§(¥%¥ 
 
4.2.2. Equilibrium 
    As before, two equations play a key role in the solution of the model. The two 
equations are: 
3.73                                                       8¥ 7 ,¥ 
3.74             , ¡ 
¢£¤
 T   
.¥ 7 '1  !xp .¦§(¥%¥. 7 '1  !xp .¦§(¥%¥  
    With embodied technological change, growth affects entrepreneurship via three 
mechanisms. The first two mechanisms are the capitalization effect and the firm size 
effect, which were also present with disembodied technological change. The third 
mechanism operates via changes in the optimal duration of a job, labeled the employment 
duration effect. As the growth rate increases, the average duration of a job becomes 
shorter. All else being equal, this reduces the value of opening vacancies and thereby the 
value of becoming an entrepreneur. 
    The following proposition derives the ways in which entrepreneurship and 
unemployment depend on the exogenous growth rate when the capitalization and firm 




PROPOSITION 7: Suppose technological growth is embodied, there are labor market 
frictions, the capitalization effect is absent, i.e. the effective discount rate is independent 
of growth, R′(g)=1, and the firm size effect is absent, i.e. entrepreneurial ability is 
independent of growth, A′(g)=0, and the initial labor market tightness satisfies ¥<1. The 
number of entrepreneurs is decreasing in the growth rate g and the number of 
unemployed workers is increasing in g. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
 
    The intuition of the proposition is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.5. With embodied 
technological change, a change in the growth rate affects not only the location of the 
entrepreneurship curve but also that of the job creation curve. As with frictionless labor 
markets, an increase in the growth rate reduces the optimal duration of a job, which shifts 
upward the entrepreneurship curve. According to equation (74), the job creation curve 
rotates around ¥ =1 when the optimal duration decreases, with the new job creation curve 
being above (below) the previous one if ¥ <1 (¥ >1, respectively). By inspecting Figure 
3.5, one notices that it is only in the region where  ¥ <1 that an increase in the growth rate 
causes both the entrepreneurship and job creation curves to shift upward. This ensures 
that an increase in the growth rate decreases the number of entrepreneurs when ¥ <1. To 
be able to sign the impact of technological change on entrepreneurship when ¥ >1, 
further restrictions on the elasticities of the entrepreneurship and job creation curves are 
needed. 
    The result that the job creation curve rotates around ¥ =1 when the optimal job 
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duration of a job changes is based on the assumption that the matching function is 
homogenous of degree 1, as it implies that the probability a firm fills a vacancy is q(¥) 
and the probability of an unemployed worker finding a job is ¥q(¥); thus, for ¥ <1, the 
probability of filling a vacancy is higher than the probability of finding a job. Evaluating 
the steady-state value of employment n (_­  0) from the entrepreneur's perspective, 
equation (69) implies a level of employment of 
3.75                                   _    '1  !xp .¦§(%¥ | ¢£¤ T. 7 '1  !xp .¦§(%¥  
From the worker's perspective, the steady state level of employment implied by equation 
(70) is 
3.76                                      _    '1  !xp .¦§(¥%¥. 7 '1  !xp .¦§(¥%¥  
At the steady state, the levels of employment implied by the two equations must be the 
same. Now, if the reservation entrepreneurial ability  and labor market tightness ¥ were 
to remain fixed at their original levels after the reduction in the optimal job destruction 
age, the new steady state level of employment implied by equation (76) would be lower 
than that implied by equation (75). This cannot be an equilibrium. For the two new 
implied levels of employment to be the same,  has to increase and | ¢£¤ T 
has to decrease. This is achieved by an increase in the reservation ability , which 
explains the rotation upward of the job creation curve when ¥<1. The opposite occurs 
when ¥>1. 
    The rotation of the job creation curve is important because it reflects an indirect effect 
of growth, which operates via changes in labor market tightness. For any given 
reservation ability, the rotation of the job creation curve leads to an increase (decrease) in 
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labor market tightness whenever ¥<1 (¥>1, respectively). Thus, there are two forces 
operating at once when only the employment duration effect is present. On the one hand, 
the reduction of the job destruction age reduces the value of being an entrepreneur. On 
the other hand, the change in labor market tightness also affects the value of being an 
entrepreneur, with an increase in labor market tightness reducing the value of being an 
entrepreneur. When ¥<1, the two forces reduce the value of being an entrepreneur, such 
that the number of entrepreneurs decreases in equilibrium. However, when ¥>1, the two 
forces operate in different directions, such that the overall effect depends on which of the 
two forces dominates. 
    With regards to the impact of an increase in growth on unemployment, note that both 
the creative destruction effect, brought about by the reduction of the optimal duration of a 
job ¦§, and the job creation effect, brought about by the decrease in labor market 
tightness ¥, tend to increase unemployment. The composition effect operates in the same 
direction when ¥<1, so unemployment is increasing in g when ¥<1. However, the 
composition effect operates in the opposite direction than the creative destruction and job 
creation effects when ¥>1. Further conditions are then required to determine whether 
unemployment increases or decreases in response to a rise in growth when ¥>1. 
    Finally, one can generalize our results when the employment duration effect is present, 
but the conditions that emerge are very mathematically involved, so they are omitted. 
This is so because in some occasions the capitalization, firm size, and employment 
duration effects operate in different directions, such that the relative strength of each must 
be considered. Nevertheless, if the decrease in labor market tightness implied by the 
rotation of the job creation curve is sufficiently weak, then the presence of the creative 
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destruction effect reduces the likelihood that a higher rate of technological change 
increases entrepreneurship and decreases unemployment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
    This paper proposed a simple theory to examine the impact of exogenous technical 
change on entrepreneurship. Our model unveiled three mechanisms through which 
growth affects entrepreneurship: the capitalization effect, which pertains to the impact of 
growth on the effective discount rate; the firm size effect, which concerns the impact of 
growth on entrepreneurial ability at managing workers; and the employment duration 
effect, which operates via the optimal duration of a job in light of technological 
obsolescence. We found that when the labor market is frictionless, only the firm size 
effect affects entrepreneurship: growth dampens entrepreneurship if and only if growth 
enhances entrepreneurial ability. When there are frictions in the labor market, all three 
effects influence entrepreneurship. Given that in some occasions the capitalization, firm 
size, and employment duration effects operate in different directions, the relative strength 
of each has to be considered in order to evaluate the overall impact of technological 
change on entrepreneurship. 
    Labor market frictions introduce unemployment in equilibrium, which allowed us to 
study the effect of exogenous technical change on unemployment. Our model unveiled 
three mechanisms through which technological change affects unemployment: the 
composition effect, which pertains to the occupational choice decision; the job creation 
effect, which is associated with labor market tightness; and the creative destruction effect, 
which operates via the endogenous destruction of jobs resulting from technological 
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change. Once again, because these effects may operate in different directions, the relative 
strength of each has to be considered in order to evaluate the overall impact of 
technological change on unemployment. 
    Our analysis suggests that technological growth may affect entrepreneurship and 
unemployment in almost any fashion. In the absence of a firm size effect, 
entrepreneurship and unemployment tend to move in opposite directions. For example, an 
increase in the number of entrepreneurs leads to an increase in labor market tightness, 
which reduces unemployment. For entrepreneurship and unemployment to move in the 
same direction, there must be a sufficiently strong firm size effect: when this is so, a 
decrease in the number of entrepreneurs no longer necessarily leads to a decrease in labor 
market tightness.  
    Future theoretical research should aim toward deriving from first principles our 
reduced-form assumptions relating to the impact of growth on the effective discount rate 
and entrepreneurial ability at managing workers. Doing so might shed light on the 
relative strengths of some mechanisms identified in this paper. Our model also takes 
technological growth to be exogenous: the challenge lies with formulating a single 









I. Appendices to Chapter 1.    
I.i. Proof  Lemma 3 
LEMMA 3. The value functions 8⋅ and N⋅ exist and are continuously increasing in 4 
and !. N⋅ is strictly increasing in O. 
Proof 
 Rewrite the mapping defined by equations (2) and (7) as N	53, 8	53  ¦N	, 8	. Set  
N, 8  0. Given that one is maximizing continuous functions over a compact set, 
the theorem of the maximum implies that N3, 83 are continuous functions. Iterating on 
the operator T one can show that the functions N	53, 8	53 are also continuous. Then T 
maps functions from the set of continuous functions into itself. It can also be shown that 
the operator T satisfies Blackwell's monotonicity and discounting sufficient conditions 
for a contraction. Then, the Contraction Mapping Theorem implies that the functions 
8⋅ and N⋅ exist, they are unique and continuous. 
        Let V be the space of pairs of functions (84	, !	, N@O, 4	 , !	A) with the property 
that 8⋅ and N⋅ are nondecreasing in 4. Define ª as the set of strictly increasing pairs 
of such functions. To prove that <⋅ and N⋅ are strictly increasing in a, I need to show 
that ¦ Ú ª. For any 4	Ê  4	 
NO, 4	Ê , !	 
maxÛIJÛ35tÜ5Hw Ö 
 4	Ê 7 O	  IJ35 , 1 7 b	'84	53, !	53(71  b	>4?'NO, 4	53, !	53, 84	53, !	53(×  
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maxÛIJÛ35Ý ,5HÞ Ö 
 4	 7 O	  IJ35 , 1 7 b	'84	53, !	53(71  b	>4?'NO, 4	53, !	53, 84	53, !	53(× 
NO, 4	, !	 
    A similar argument can be used to show that U(at,et) is also strictly increasing in 4	. 
Proofs for the remaining propositions in the lemma are very similar to the one above and 
are therefore omitted. 
     
 
I.ii. Proof Lemma 4 
LEMMA 4. There always exists an equilibrium.  
Proof 
 This proof follows closely the proof of proposition 1 in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). 
As in their proof, I take three steps. In step 1, I show that any equilibrium solves a 
constrained problem to be specified. In step 2, I show that any allocation that solves the 
constrained problem specified in step 1 is part of an equilibrium. In step 3, I show that an 
equilibrium always exist. 
     
    Step 1 
    Let {od , ogO, NO, 4, !, u	O, 6, Od4, !, -y, %O} be part of an equilibrium. 
Then, for any set (4, !) for which an unmatched worker finds it optimal to search for a 
job, Od4, !, -y, %O solve 
1                       <;4	, !	  max1x,H,l M 
	, 	 7 *'%O(NO, 4	53, 071  *'%O(	'84	53, !	53(P 
    subject to 
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2                               j'%&(v&  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	O  1 7 6  0 
    and 
 
(A3)  O 0 /   
    To see this, take a set 4, ! for which an unmatched worker finds it optimal to search 
for a job. Let §, -§ and O§∈ Ω be the optimal actions given the state. Optimality implies 
<  <;4	, !	  max1x,H,l M
§, 	 7 *'%O§(NO§, 4	53, 071  *'%O§(	'84	53, !	53(P 
with 4	53  ,-§, !	  6 7 .-§ 7 1 7 64	  	. Now, suppose I force the agent 
with the same 4, ! to apply to a wage O «  O§. If I allow all other control variables to 
be chosen optimally, (given wage application) and label these with a double star 
4                    < 0 Ö
§§, 	 7 *t%O wNO§, 4	53, 071  *'%O§(	'84	53, !	53( × 
    For firms posting such wage w, it is true from the free entry condition that 
5                               j'%&(v&  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	O  1 7 6  0 
    Now, if {w, -§§, %§§, §§} were to yield a higher value for the same 4, !, That is, 
6                    <  M
§§, 	 7 *'%§§(NO§, 4	53, 071  *'%§§(	'84	53, !	53( P 
equations (A4) and (A6) would then imply that *'%O(  *% and %O  %. But if 
that if true, then, j%  j'%O( which together with equation (A5) implies 
 j'%&(v&  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	O  1 7 6  0 
    Therefore, E-§§, O, %§§,  §§F cannot be part of an equilibrium. 
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    Step 2 
    I now show that any allocation that solves the constrained problem described by 
equation (A1), (A2) and (A3) is part of an equilibrium. Let {O§,%§,  §} be the solution to 
the unmatched worker who decides to search and faces a state 4, ! 
<  <4	, !	  
	§, 	 7 *'%§(	NO§, 4	53, !	53 7 1  *'%§(	84	53, !	53    
Define -§ as 
 7                    j'%&(\-§  O  6-§ ∑  335		 u	O  1 7 6  0    
By construction, {O§,%§,  §,  -§} is part of an equilibrium. 
    Next, define iO as the solution to 
<  <4	, !	  
	§, 	 7 *'iO(	NO§, 4	53, !	537 1  *'iO(	84	53, !	53 
and let iO  0 if no solution exists. Now suppose one can find a set 
{Oª, iOª,  §, -ª} such that 
 8                    j'iOª(\-§  Oª  6-§  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	Oª  1 7 6  0 
For such a triple, iOª  0. Now define %ª as 
 9                    j'%ª(\-ª  Oª  6-ª  p 11 7 6q	

	 u	Oª  1 7 6  0 
  Obviously %ª  iOª. Also, 

	§, 	 7 *'%ª(	NOª, 4	53, !	53 7 1  *'%Ê(	84	53, !	53  < 
    Given that EOª, %ª, § , -ªF satisfies all the constraints and yields a higher value for the 
searcher than {O§,%§,  §,  -§}, the latter cannot have been a solution to the constrained 
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problem. In the solution to the constrained problem, the profit condition is satisfied with 
equality and therefore, the subset is part of an equilibrium. 
     
    Step 3 
    To show existence of an equilibrium I need to consider two particular cases. These 
cases depend critically on the maximum wage a firm would ever consider offering. If the 
firm assumes that the worker will never choose to endogenously terminate a match and 
can hire a worker with certainty next period, the present discounted value of future profits 
by posting a wage w is given by 
 o  j'%O(\-§  O  6-§  p 11 7 6q	

	  1 7 6  0 
where k§ is determined by f′(k§)=r+δ. Free entry condition implies J=0 which results in a 
maximum wage of that is implicitly defined by ŵ  \-§  6-§  6 7 ./j'%ŵ( 
and 
\-§  6-§  6 7 . . 
     
    Case 1:  / 0  
    The maximum wage a firm would be willing to post is too low for workers to apply to 
them. No firm enters the market resulting in Ω=Ø. Firms have no incentives to deviate. 
For wages lower than b no one applies, so firms' profit equal -c if they decide to enter. 
For any wage w>b≥  expected profits are negative by construction. 
    Given the properties of the production function available to the unmatched workers, 
the Markov property for the productivity and the business project shocks, and the fact 
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that the unmatched worker value function exists and is well-defined 
(U(at,et)=max(S
NS(at,et),N
NS(at,et))), the distributions d4, ! and gO, 4, ! are 
stationary (with gO, 4, ! =0 for any O, 4, !) and an equilibrium exists. 
     
    Case 2: /   
    It can be easily shown that no worker applies to a wage below b. Then O ∈  '/, (. 
Then, the constraint set in the unmatched worker problem is compact. Given that the 
unmatched worker value function is continuous, the constrained problem has a solution. 
By step 2, I know that the solution is part of an equilibrium. 
    Depending on parameter values, two different types of equilibria can emerge. One with 
only unmatched workers. The other with both matched and unmatched workers. In the 
one with unmatched workers only, Ω=Ø. The equilibrium will have the same features as 
case 1 above. 
    In cases where unmatched workers decide to search for a job, one can show that Ω=Ø. 
cannot be an equilibrium. Since NO, 4, 0   8á, 4, 0, as long as there are agents 
without business projects, workers will apply to vacancies offering a wage greater than b. 
I need to check whether a firm has incentives to deviate and post wages greater than b. 
The deviating firm gets an infinite amount of applicants, which implies that it gets 
matched to a worker with probability 1. If the deviating firm posts a wage smaller than 
\-§  6-§  6 7 ., it makes a strictly positive profit and the deviation if profitable. 
    Given the properties of the self-employed and the firm's production functions, the 
properties of the productivity and business project shocks, and that in equilibrium 
1 7 6  1 given that the matched and unmatched workers value functions are super-
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martingales, the distributions d4, ! and gO, 4, ! are stationary and an equilibrium 
exists. 
 
I.iii. Fear of Failure 
To understand the fear of failure effect more clearly, suppose there are states in which an 
unmatched worker finds it optimal to search for a job. Define the set of all such states as 
Δ. This implies that, for 4	, !	 ∈ Δ, the value of being working for a corporation next 
period must be higher than the expected value of being self-employed next period, since 
searching workers must commit to accepting a job if offered. That is, 
NOd4	, !	, 4	53, 0    	'84	53, !	53(, since otherwise the unmatched worker 
would not look for a job at a firm. Now, if for these states the unmatched worker chooses 
to search while self-employed over searching while unemployed and if 
*%'Od4	, !	(    1, it must be the case that 
<;4	, !	  max,1,HIJ∈ΩE
	, 1 7 1  *'%+O(	'84	53, !	53(7 *'%+O('NO, 4	53, 0(F 
                    
d4	, !	, 1 7 'NOd4	, !	, 4	53d 4	, !	, 0( z <;Å4	, !	     
where 4	53d 4	, !	  ,-d4	, !	, !	 7 1 7 6'4	  d4	, !	(  6-d4	, !	. 
<;Å4	, !	 is the value of being a self-employed worker this period, with a guaranteed 
job at a firm that starts next period and pays a wage wU(at,et), and with assets next period 
equal to 4	53d 4	, !	. 49  Similarly, if for 4	, !	 ∈ Δ the unmatched worker chooses to 
                                                 
49 <;Å4	 , !	 is introduced to capture the cost of not getting the targeted job with probability one, 
abstracting from other implications for optimal behavior of having a frictionless labor market. This is why Od·, d· and -d· are used in the definition of <;Å4	 , !	. If one removes labor market frictions and 
allows workers to maximize over all choice variables, differences between <;4	 , !	and <;Å4	 , !	come 
not only from changes in the probability of getting a job, but also from changes in the choice variables. In 
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search while unemployed over searching while self-employed, 9;4	, !	   9;Å4	, !	, 
where 9;Å4	, !	 is the value of being an unemployed worker this period, with a 
guaranteed job at a firm that starts next period and pays a wage Od4	, !	, and initial 
assets next period equal to 4	53d 4	, !	.  Now, define 
8:y4	, !	  >4?@9;Å4	!	, 9:;:y4	!	, <;Å4	!	, <:;:y4	!	A 
where  
 9:;:y4	, !	  
d4	, !	, 0 7 	'8:y4	53d 4	, !	, !	53( 
 <:;:y4	, !	  
d4	, !	, 1 7 	'8:y4	53d 4	, !	, !	53( 8:y4	, !	 is then the value of being unmatched when the fear of failure is not present. 
Its definition guarantees that whenever an unmatched worker searches for a job (either in 
the current or future periods), he always gets the targeted job with probability one. 
    The fear of failure then prevent currently matched workers for whom 
8:y4	1>NO, 4	1)> 84	1 to enter self-employment. These workers would be 
willing to become self-employed if they were guaranteed getting a paid job in the future 
with certainty, after just one period of search. They choose to remain matched due to the 
existence of search frictions in the labor market. 
     
I.iv. Frictionless Economy 
In the frictionless economy, unmatched workers can instantly move back to paid 
employment, if they decide to do so. To allow for this possibility, I must modify my 
model so that workers learn immediately whether they get their target job. In addition, to 
ensure that workers get their target job with probability one, I set   ∞, so that 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular, if one removes labor market frictions, workers would only apply to the highest wage offered. 
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*'%O(  1. To eliminate all other frictions, I further assume that workers can 
coordinate which vacancies they apply for and that firms can also coordinate on which 
ones will post vacancies. Under these assumptions, workers only apply to jobs paying the 
highest wage in equilibrium, and %O  1 and %O  0 if O  O. This 
implies that * '%O(  1 and '%O(  0 if O  O. Finally, given that posting 
a vacancy is costly and that workers only apply to O, the set of all wages posted is 
Ω[  EOF. 
    In this new setting the value function of an unmatched worker becomes 
84	, !	  >4?@94	!	, <4	!	A 
where 
94	, !	  max »
	, 0 7 	t>4?@84	53, !	53, N4	53, 0Aw¼ 
subject to 
 
4	53  1 7 6'4	  	( 
4	53 0 0 
And 
<4	, !	  max,1 »
	, 1 7 	t>4?@84	53, !	53, N4	53, 0Aw¼ 
subject to 
4	53  ,-	, !	  6 7 .-	 7 1 7 6'4	  	( 
-	  R4	 
4	53 0 0 
 
    The value functions of a matched workers can now be written as 
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N4	, !	  max »
	, 1 7 	t>4?@N4	53, !	53, 84	53, !	53Aw¼ 
subject to 
4	53  1 7 6'4	 7 O  	( 
4	53 0 0 
 
 
II. Appendices to Chapter 2.    
II.i. Variables Definitions 
WEALTH: The measure of wealth used includes the value of businesses owned, deposits 
in checking and saving accounts, the value of stocks, mutual funds, or investment trusts 
(including stocks in IRA's), value on wheels (cars, trucks, etc.), real estate and home 
equity. 
    LABOR INCOME: The measure of labor income used includes the worker's wage 
income, bonuses, overtime and commissions, the income from professional practice or 
trade as well as the labor part of farm income, business income, market gardening income 
and roomers and boarders income. 
    AVERAGE LABOR INCOME: Average of the labor income in the 5 years previous to 
the interview date. If data for the worker's labor income is not available for any of the 
previous 5 years, the average is calculated using data on the years for which labor income 
is available. 
    AVERAGE LABOR INCOME IN S.E (Self-Employment): Similar to average labor 




    AVERAGE LABOR INCOME IN P.E (Paid-Employment): Similar to average labor 
income, but only averaging the labor income in those years when the worker is in paid-
employment. 
    HOURLY INCOME: I measure this as hourly labor earnings. The PSID asks different 
questions to salaried workers, workers paid by the hour and workers paid in other forms. 
All questions ask how much would the worker earn for an extra hour of regular work 
time. 
    EVER SELF-EMPLOYED: Dummy variable capturing whether the worker was ever 
self-employed in the 5 years previous to the interview date. 
    UNEMPLOYED BETWEEN INTERVIEWS: Dummy variable capturing whether the 
worker was ever unemployed in the year previous to the interview date. 
    UNEMPLOYED IN THE 3 YEARS BEFORE LAST: Dummy variable capturing 
whether the workers was ever unemployed in the 3 years previous to a year before the 
interview date. 































NOTE: This table shows the proportion of workers that are self-
employed, conditional on having a particular characteristic. Standard 
























Married (N=6,573) 14.47 (0.58) 
Not Married (N=1,528 ) 9.56  (0.96) 
White (N=5,059) 14.31 (0.42) 
Black (N=2,040) 4.22  (0.74) 
High School Drop-out (N= 1,247 ) 11.85  (0.65) 
High School Grad (N=2,497) 10.06  (0.75) 
College Drop-out (N=1,704) 14.65 (1.06) 
College Grad (N=1,706) 16.41  (1.01) 
21-25 (N=633) 7.42  (1.43) 
26-30 (N=1,210) 9.20  (0.62) 
31-35 (N=1,548) 10.02  (0.92) 
36-40 (N=1,421) 13.52 (1.11) 
41-45 (N=1,065) 14.60 (1.28) 
46-50 (N=660) 18.14 (1.73) 
51-55 (N=419) 19.41  (2.32) 
56-60 (N=339 ) 19.83  (2.47) 
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TABLE A2: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
NOTE: All dollar figures are expressed in 1994 dollars. 
 
 



















 ( N = 6,456 ) 
 
Self-Employed 
( N=864 ) 
p-value of 
difference 
Age 38.30 41.63 < .01 
Dummy: Married 0.76 0.83 < .01 
Dummy: White 0.88 0.95 < .01 
Dummy: Black 0.10 0.03 < .01 
Hours Worked per Week 44.72 47.31 < .01 
Dummy: Education    
High School Drop-Out 0.14 0.13 .44 
High School Grad 0.33 0.24 < .01 
College Drop-Out 0.23 0.26 .22 
College Grad 0.30 0.37 < .01 
Hourly Income    
Mean 19.11 36.28 < .01 
10th Percentile 7.80 7.6 < .01 
50th  Percentile 16.19 21.6 < .01 
90th  Percentile 31.15 74.42 < .01 
Wealth    
Mean 104,941.5 485,037.2    < .01 
10th  Percentile 800 13,000 < .01 
50th  Percentile 54,500 204,000 < .01 
90th  Percentile 289,200   1,001,500 < .01 
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TABLE A3: Probability of Leaving Self-Employment By Next Year 
Note: The numbers reported are average marginal effects. Marginal effects are 
calculated for each individual, and then averaged across individuals. Duration in self-
employment is included as a fifth order polynomial. Newly self-employed refers to 
those workers who have been self-employed for less than a year. * and ** means that 
the effects are significant at a 5 and 1% significance. 













Year 1994 -3.173 -0.8387    
Business Owner -24.994** -23.574** 
Married -12.264** -8.835    
Black 8.622     14.893    
High School Grad -7.450    -25.615*    
College Drop-Out 3.559    12.280    
College Grad 1.047    -6.215    
Hours Week -0.284    -0.090    
Labor Income/10,000 -0.067*  0.495 
Age 26-30 -23.805*  -28.333   
Age 31-35 -24.980    -23.625    
Age 36-40 -19.447    -13.372    
Age 41-45 -26.426*  -27.787    
Age 46-50 -22.347*    -40.264    
Age 51-55 -28.961**   -34.418    
Age 56-60 -13.222      0.8622    
Duration in S.E. -1.506*   - 
Wealth /100,000 0.167 -0.374 
   
Observations 810 237 
Pseudo-R2 0.3063 0.2326 
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Conditional on being … 
Proportion of Job 
Search Stopgap 
who are Business 
Ownership Stopgap  
Proportion of 
Ownership 






All Self-Employed (S.E.) 39.74 (N=77) 16.25 (N=175) 0.1660** (N=817) 
Old S.E. 31.70 (N=32) 12.02 (N=77) 0.1302** (N=576) 
Newly Self-Employed 47.61 (N=45) 21.11 (N=98) 0.1599     (N=246) 
Newly S.E. – Unemployed 77.32 (N=22) 36.01 (N=35) 0.2992*     (N=55) 
Newly S.E.- Not Unemployed 32.84 (N=23) 14.22 (N=63) 0.0712*   (N=192) 
S.E. High School Drop-Out  58.11 (N=14) 24.68 (N=44) 0.2518*   (N=116) 
S.E. High School Grad  42.99 (N=18) 10.73 (N=51) 0.1487** (N=220) 
S.E. College Drop-Out  28.79 (N=15) 11.71 (N=29) 0.1103** (N=207) 
S.E. College Grad  35.13 (N=30) 17.58 (N=51) 0.1481** (N=267) 
S.E. White 39.52 (N=52) 15.99 (N=126) 0.1635** (N=699) 
S.E. Black  48.50 (N=24) 26.86 (N=43) 0.1788** (N=102) 
S.E. Married  34.88 (N=52) 14.89 (N=121) 0.1513** (N=692) 
S.E. Not Married  52.13 (N=25) 19.26 (N=109) 0.1674** (N=125) 
S.E. Age 21-25  60.00 (N=9) 32.43 (N=14) 0.1283       (N=34) 
S.E. Age 26-30  49.76 (N=10) 13.66 (N=27) 0.0871       (N=90) 
S.E. Age 31-35 18.36 (N=15) 5.83 (N=36) 0.0346       (N=90) 
S.E. Age 36-40  44.38 (N=16) 15.59 (N=33) 0.2059** (N=168) 
S.E. Age 41-45  41.90 (N=9) 26.00 (N=20) 0.2656** (N=145) 
S.E. Age 46-50  36.72 (N=11) 16.98 (N=21) 0.1672** (N=113) 
S.E. Age 51-55  36.72 (N=5) 20.67 (N=11) 0.2965**   (N=64) 
S.E. Age 56-60 100.00 (N=2) 7.45 (N=13) 0.1592*     (N=62) 
Note: The second and third columns of this table shows the proportion of self-employed 
workers that are stopgap self-employed according to the job search and business ownership 
definition, conditional on satisfying the characteristics specified on the row and on being 
stopgap self-employed according to the stopgap definition specified in the column. The third 
column shows correlation between the variables conditional on satisfying the characteristic. The 
numbers in brackets are the number of observations used to calculate the proportions. Old self-
employed refers to workers that have been self-employed for over a year. Newly self-employed 
are workers that have been self-employed for less than a year. ** denotes statistically significant at 












TABLE A5: Proportion of Self-Employed Workers Using  
Self-Employment as a Stopgap. 
Note: This table shows the proportion of self-employed workers using self-employment as a 
stopgap, conditional on having a particular characteristic. Old self-employed refers to 
workers that have been self-employed for over a year. Newly self-employed are workers that 













 PROPORTION OF STOPGAP SELF-
EMPLOYED 
 








Self-Employed ( S.E) (N = 871) 6.916  (1.004)      16.909  (1.531) 21.077(1.644) 
Old Self-Employed (N = 590) 4.688  (0.979)       12.368  (1.604) 15.571(1.736) 
Newly Self-Employed (N= 286) 12.704(2.517)      28.656  (3.449) 35.312(3.625) 
Newly S.E. - Unemployed(N= 65) 23.413(7.536)      50.306  (8.841) 55.606(8.731) 
Newly S.E.- Not Unemployed(N= 220) 10.353(2.548)      23.903  (3.567) 30.857(3.864) 
S.E. High School Drop-Out (N=129) 11.492(3.842)      27.058  (4.978) 31.872(5.222) 
S.E. High School Grad (N=235) 4.076  (1.279)      16.328  (2.897) 18.65  (2.997) 
S.E. College Drop-Out (N=218) 5.334  (1.722)      13.111  (2.801) 16.910(3.056) 
S.E. College Grad (N=282) 8.435  (1.856)      16.863  (2.617) 22.335(2.853) 
S.E. White (N=743) 6.757  (1.045)      16.507  (1.571) 20.625(1.690) 
S.E. Black (N=110) 16.708(5.089)      30.175 (8.687) 38.780(8.875) 
S.E. Married (N=723) 6.005  (0.969) 14.066  (1.504) 17.977(1.631) 
S.E. Not Married (N=147) 11.275(3.453)      30.512  (4.913) 35.909(5.121)   
S.E. Age 21-25 (N=36) 25.451(8.958)      39.051(10.243) 51.83(10.233) 
S.E. Age 26-30 (N=193) 8.962  (3.633)      21.952  (5.178) 27.916(5.571) 
S.E. Age 31-35 (N=150) 7.471  (2.331)      23.519  (4.353) 29.619(4.533) 
S.E. Age 36-40 (N=199) 4.442  (1.536)      12.642  (2.866) 15.114(3.023) 
S.E. Age 41-45 (N=152) 6.989  (2.708) 11.261  (3.095) 15.322(3.591) 
S.E. Age 46-50 (N=121) 6.846  (2.592)      14.809  (3.821) 19.141(4.186) 
S.E. Age 51-55 (N=68) 4.561  (2.591)     12.853  (4.512) 14.758(4.747) 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE A7: Proportions of Self-Employed Workers in Different Occupations. 
Note: ** and * indicate statistically significant differences between stopgap and other self-employed workers at 1% 





























( N = 77 ) 
Others 
( N =794 ) 
Stopgap 
( N = 175 ) 
Others 
( N = 696 ) 
Stopgap 
( N = 216 ) 
Others 
( N = 655 ) 
Professional and 
Technical Workers 
0.27 0.22 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.21 
Managers and 
Administrators 
0.24 0.41** 0.15 0.44** 0.18 0.45** 
Sales Workers 
 
0.13 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 
Clerical and Kindred 
Workers 
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01* 0.03 0.01 
Craftsmen and 
Kindred Workers 
0.17 0.17 0..23 0.16 0.21 0.16 
Operatives, except 
Transport 
0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Transport Equipment 
Operatives 
0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Laborers, except 
Farm 
0.11 0.04** 0.09 0.04** 0.10 0.03* 
Service Workers 
 
0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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TABLE A8 Proportions of Self-Employed Workers in Different Industries. 
 







( N = 77 ) 
Others 
( N =874 ) 
Stopgap 
( N = 175 ) 
Others 
( N = 696 ) 
Stopgap 
( N = 216 ) 
Others 
( N = 654 ) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fisheries 
0.12 0.04** 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.04 
Construction 
 
0.18 0.24* 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.24 
Manufacturing 
 
0 0.07* 0.04 0.07* 0.03 0.07* 
Transportation/Com
munications/Utilities 
0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
0.20 0.20 0.11 0.21** 0.13 0.21** 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 
Business and Repair 
Services 
0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 
Personal Services 
 
0 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Entertainment and 
Recreation Services 
0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Professional and 
Related Services 
0.19 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.15* 
Note: ** and * indicate statistically significant differences between stopgap and other self-employed workers at 1% 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE A4: Probability of Becoming Stopgap Self-Employed As a 
Function of Wealth - Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
Note: All other controls included in the probit are evaluated at their mean values. 
 
 
III. Appendices to Chapter 3.    
III.i. Proof of Proposition 3 
    One can show that, along the balanced growth path, the value of having a vacant job 
and the value of being unemployed can be expressed as 
3.1              ¥   1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 ¥%¥(ch,  ,'1  %¥ 7 h,  , 7 . 7 ¥%¥( 
3.2     8¥   /h,  , 7  %¥'a  / 7 (h,  ,'1  %¥ 7 h,  , 7 . 7 ¥%¥( 
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Search Def. Bus.Own. Def.
Combined Def.
Probability of Becoming Stopgap Self-Employed - IV Estimation
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system of equations formed by equations (3.43) and (3.44) as 
3.3      
â, ¥, ,    /'1  %¥ 7 h,  , 7 . 7 È¥( 7 È¥'a  / 7 ( 7 h,  ,,E'1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 È¥(F  
3.4                          ã, ¥, ,  , ¡ 
¢£¤
 T 
.¥ 7 È¥. 7 È¥  
where È¥ z ¥%¥  > , 
/
. Given that we assumed that the matching function 
> , 
 is homogeneous of degree 1 in vacancies and unemployment, Èª¥  0. 
Comparative statics can be performed by total differentiation of equations (A3.3) and 
(A3.4) with respect to g: 
3.5                           äâ, ¥, ,ä ää, 7 äâ, ¥, ,ä¥ ä¥ä, 7 äâ, ¥, ,ä,  
3.6                           äã, ¥, ,ä ää, 7 äã, ¥, ,ä¥ ä¥ä, 7 äã, ¥, ,ä,  
In matrix notation, we have 
3.7                      åäâ, ¥, ,ä äâ, ¥, ,ä¥äã, ¥, ,ä äã, ¥, ,ä¥ æ çèè
èéää,ä¥ä,êëë
ëì  çèè
èé äâ, ¥, ,ä, äã, ¥, ,ä, êëë
ëì       
Define Y z ¿í,½,2 í,½,2½î,½,2 î,½,2½ À. The elements of B are the following: 
3.8                                                   äâ, ¥, ,ä  1 
3.9               äâ, ¥, ,ä¥   8ª¥¥ 7 ª¥'8¥ 7 h,  ,('¥(Ç  0 
3.10           äã, ¥, ,ä  ,  ,\ | 
¢£¤ TÇ  0 
161 
 
3.11                   äã, ¥, ,ä¥   .¥ 7 Èª¥. 7 È¥  Èª¥'.¥ 7 È¥('. 7 È¥(Ç  0 
Equations (A3.8) through (A3.11) can be used to sign the slopes of the entrepreneurship 
and job creation curves: 
3.12                             cT¥TïÃ   päâ, ¥, ,ä äâ, ¥, ,ä¥ð q  0 
3.13                             cT¥TïÄÅÃ   päã, ¥, ,ä äã, ¥, ,ä¥ð q  0 
Equations (A3.8) through (A3.11)also allow one to sign the determinant of B: 
3.14             det Y  äâ, ¥, ,ä äã, ¥, ,ä¥  äã, ¥, ,ä äâ, ¥, ,ä¥  0 
    We can now use Cramer's rule to calculate the effect of growth on entrepreneurship: 
3.15                         TT,  'det Y({3 òò
äâ, ¥, ,ä, äâ, ¥, ,ä¥ äã, ¥, ,ä, äã, ¥, ,ä¥ ò
ò 
where  




3.17                                
äâ, ¥, ,ä,  h,  , /'1  %¥ 7 h,  , 7 . 7 È¥( 7 È¥'a  / 7 ( 7 h,  ,,E'1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 È¥(FÇ
 hª,  1'/ 7 (,E'1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 È¥(F
7 ª, /'1  %¥ 7 h,  , 7 . 7 È¥( 7 È¥'a  / 7 ( 7 h,  ,',(ÇE'1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 È¥(F       
Therefore, the equilibrium effect of growth on the reservation ability is given by 
162 
 
3.18       TT,  'det Y({3óôôõôôö{ åäã, ¥, ,ä,óôôõôôö?
äâ, ¥, ,ä¥óôôõôôö{ 
äâ, ¥, ,ä,óôôõôôö?
äã, ¥, ,ä¥óôôõôôö{ æ 
where a minus sign below a term implies it is negative and a question mark implies the 
term cannot be signed unless further assumptions are imposed. 
    Similarly, the equilibrium effect of growth on labor market tightness is given by 
3.19       T¥T,  'det Y({3óôôõôôö{ å äâ, ¥, ,äóôôõôôö{
äã, ¥, ,ä,óôôõôôö? 
äã, ¥, ,äóôôõôôö{
äâ, ¥, ,ä,óôôõôôö? æ 
    When ª,  0, equation (A3.16) implies that î,½,22  0 and equation (A3.17) 
implies that 
í,½,22  0 if and only if hª,  1. Given these findings, equations 
(A3.18) and (a3.19) imply that when ª,  0,  Î2  0 and Î½2  0 if and only if 
hª,  1. 
    To calculate the equilibrium effect of technological growth on unemployment, 
differentiate equation (3.42) to get 
3.20                        T




Therefore, we find that 
Î2  0 if and only if hª,  1. 
 
III.ii. Proof of Proposition 4 
Using the Cramer's rule, we showed in equation (A3.15) that, regardless of the 




                      
ÎÎ2  'det Y({3 ù
í,½,22 í,½,2½ î,½,22 î,½,2½ ù 
with det(B)<0. To be able to able to evaluate this effect when R′(g)=1, we need to 
evaluate the determinant on the right-hand-side of equation (A3.15). To do that, note that 
3.21                                            äâ, ¥, ,ä,   ª,,  
3.22                               äã, ¥, ,ä,  ª, ¡ 
¢£¤
 T 
    To obtain 
í,½,2½  and î,½,2½  first re-express equations (A3.12) through (A3.13) as 
3.23                             cTT¥ïÃ   päâ, ¥, ,ä¥ äâ, ¥, ,äð q  0 
3.24                             cTT¥ïÄÅ   päã, ¥, ,ä¥ äã, ¥, ,äð q  0 
    Using equations (A3.8) and (A3.10) we get 
3.25                                                äâ, ¥, ,ä¥    cTT¥ïÃ 
3.26                 äã, ¥, ,ä¥  ,  ª,\ | 
¢£¤ TÇ cTT¥ïÄÅ 
    According to equation (A3.15), 
ÎÎ2  0 if and only if the determinant in equation 
(A3.15) is negative. When hª,  1, this condition is satisfied if and only if 
ª, | ¢£¤ T cTT¥ïÃ   ª,, ,  ª,\ | 
¢£¤ TÇ cTT¥ïÄÅ  




Ç| ¢£¤ T 
\  
if A′(g)>0. Otherwise the inequality sign would be reversed. 
    Re-expressing in terms of elasticities, we obtain the following expression: cÂ, ¥|ÃcÂ, ¥|ÄÅ  Ç| ¢£¤ T 7
\  
which is the condition used in the lemma. Note that a reversed inequality signed is 
obtained if A′(g)<0. 
     
III.iii. Proof of Proposition 5 
In equation (A3.20) we showed that equilibrium effect of technological growth on 
unemployment is given by 
                                          T




   To be able to evaluate this effect when R′(g)=1, we need to evaluate 
Î½2 when R′(g)=1. 
To do that, remember that 
Î½2 is given by 
                  T¥T,  'det Y({3óôôõôôö{ å äâ, ¥, ,äóôôõôôö{
äã, ¥, ,ä,óôôõôôö? 
äã, ¥, ,äóôôõôôö{
äâ, ¥, ,ä,óôôõôôö? æ 
    According to equation (A3.21) and (A3.22) b^,_í,½,22   b^,_î,½,22  >0 (<0) 
iff A′(g)>0 (A′(g)<0). Therefore 
Î½2>0 (<0) iff A′(g)>0 (A′(g)<0). 
    Now, according to equation (A3.20) for 
ÎÎ2 to be positive 
165 
 
3.27                                    TT,  .Èª¥\'. 7 È¥( T¥T, 
    Replacing the expressions for 
ÎÎ2 and Î½Î2 into equation (A3.27) and multiplying both 
sides by ,/ª, and re-arranging we get 
3.28  . 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cTT¥ïÄÅ  Ê, | 
¢£¤ T cTT¥ïÃ 
  Ñ2Ü½ú'³5½( ÝÇ 7 1 7 úy  | ¢£¤ TÞ  
The inequality sign should be reversed if A′(g)<0. 
    Defining Æ z 1   | ¢£¤ T, the expression above can be repressed as 
3.29 . 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cTT¥ïÄÅ  Ê, Æ1   cTT¥ïÃ 
  ,ÈÊ¥\'. 7 È¥( ÌÇ 7 É1 7 \ Ë Æ1  Í 
or in terms of elasticities 
3.30 . 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cÂ, ¥|ÄÅ  Ê, Æ1   cÂ, ¥|Ã 
  ,ÈÊ¥¥\'. 7 È¥( Ì 7 É1 7 \ Ë Æ1  Í 
    Remember that the inequality sign should be reversed if A′(g)<0. 
     
III.iv. Proof of Proposition 6 
Using the Cramer's rule, we showed in equation (A3.15) that, regardless of the 




                      
ÎÎ2  'det Y({3 ù
í,½,22 í,½,2½ î,½,22 î,½,2½ ù 
with det(B)<0. To be able to able to evaluate this effect we need to evaluate the 
determinant on the right-hand-side of equation (A3.15). To do that, note that 
3.31 
 äâ, ¥, ,ä,   ª,, É1  hª,  1', 7 / 7 (,E'1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 È¥(FË  
and 
3.32                               äã, ¥, ,ä,  ª, ¡ 
¢£¤
 T 
    Using equations (A3.8) and (A3.10) we get 
3.33                                                äâ, ¥, ,ä¥    cTT¥ïÃ 
3.34                 äã, ¥, ,ä¥  ,  ª,\ | 
¢£¤ TÇ cTT¥ïÄÅ 
According to equation (A3.15), 
ÎÎ2  0 if and only if the determinant in equation (A3.15) 
is negative. This condition is satisfied if and only if 
Ê, | ¢£¤ T cTT¥ïÃ   Ê,, É1  hª,  1', 7 / 7 (ª,'1  %¥'a  /(  'h,  , 7 . 7 È¥((Ë § 
§ û,  ª,\ | ¢£¤ TÇ cTT¥ïÄÅü 
which can be simplifies to 
cTT¥ïÃcTT¥ïÄÅ  Ψ É
Ç@1  AÆ 7 \ Ë 
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where Ψ z 1  °Ê2{3'Ñ25Ò5Ó(ÑÊ2'3{Ôl½'Õ{Ò({'°2{25³5Ô½(( and Æ z | ¢£¤ T. A reversed 
inequality signed is obtained if A′(g)<0. 
    In terms of elasticities, the expression above becomes cÂ, ¥|ÃcÂ, ¥|ÄÅ  Ψ É Ç@1  AÆ 7 \ Ë 
    Note that a reversed inequality signed is obtained if A′(g)<0.   
    To look at how unemployment reacts, remember that in equation (A3.20) we showed 
that equilibrium effect of technological growth on unemployment is given by 
                                          T




   Therefore, for 
ÎÎ2 to be positive  ÎÎ2  ³yÊ½ú'³5½( Î½Î2. Substituting ÎÎ2 and Î½Î2 in and    
multiplying both sides by A(g)/A′(g) 
. 7 È¥ É. 7 ÈÊ¥ 7 ÈÊ¥'.¥ 7 È¥(. 7 È¥ Ë cTT¥ïÄÅ  Ê, | 
¢£¤ T cTT¥ïÃ 
  Ñ2Ü½ú'³5½( ÝÇΨ 7 1 7 Ψ úy | ¢£¤ TÞ  
Defining Æ z @1  A | ¢£¤ T and re-expressing in terms of elasticities, one 
gets the expression in the proposition. Remember that the inequality sign should be 
reversed if A’(g)<0 
     
III.v. Proof of Proposition 7 




3.35                                           â, ¥, ,    8¥, , 7 ,¥, , 
3.36                      ã, ¥, ,    , ¡ 
¢£¤
 T  
.¥ 7 ¦¥, ,È¥. 7 ¦¥, ,È¥  
where T¥, g z '1  !xp .¦§(. Note that Tþ¥, g z ½,þ
2  0 and T½¥, g z
½,þ
½  0 . 
    Comparative statics can be performed by total differentiation of equation (3.35) and 
(3.36) with respect to g 
 
3.37                           äâ, ¥, ,ä ää, 7 äâ, ¥, ,ä¥ ä¥ä, 7 äâ, ¥, ,ä,  
3.38                           äã, ¥, ,ä ää, 7 äã, ¥, ,ä¥ ä¥ä, 7 äã, ¥, ,ä,  
In matrix notation, we have 
3.39                      åäâ, ¥, ,ä äâ, ¥, ,ä¥äã, ¥, ,ä äã, ¥, ,ä¥ æ çèè
èéää,ä¥ä,êëë
ëì  çèè
èé äâ, ¥, ,ä, äã, ¥, ,ä, êëë
ëì       
Define Y z ¿í,½,2 í,½,2½î,½,2 î,½,2½ À. The elements of B are the following: 
3.40                                                   äâ, ¥, ,ä  1 
3.41               äâ, ¥, ,ä¥   8ª¥,¥ 7 ª¥'8¥ 7 h,  ,('¥(Ç  0 
3.42           äã, ¥, ,ä  ,  ,\ | 
¢£¤ TÇ  0 
169 
 
3.43         äã, ¥, ,ä¥   .¥ 7 ¦¥, ,ÈÊ¥ 7 ¦¥, ,È¥. 7 ¦¥, ,È¥  
 '.¥ 7 ¦¥, ,È¥('¦½¥, ,È¥ 7 ¦¥, ,Èª¥('. 7 ¦¥, ,È¥(Ç  0            
Equations (A3.40) through (A3.43) can be used to sign the slopes of the entrepreneurship 
and job creation curves: 
3.44                             cT¥TïÃ   päâ, ¥, ,ä äâ, ¥, ,ä¥ð q  0 
3.45                             cT¥TïÄÅÃ   päã, ¥, ,ä äã, ¥, ,ä¥ð q  0 
Equations (A3.40) through (A3.43) also allow one to sign the determinant of B: 
3.46             det Y  äâ, ¥, ,ä äã, ¥, ,ä¥  äã, ¥, ,ä äâ, ¥, ,ä¥  0 
    We can now use Cramer's rule to calculate the effect of growth on entrepreneurship: 
3.47                         TT,  'det Y({3 òò
äâ, ¥, ,ä, äâ, ¥, ,ä¥ äã, ¥, ,ä, äã, ¥, ,ä¥ ò
ò 
where  
3.48             äâ, ¥, ,ä,   ä8¥, ,/ä,¥, , 7 8¥, , 7 ',¥, ,(Ç  0     
and 
3.49         äã, ¥, ,ä,   ¦2¥, ,È¥. 7 ¦¥, ,È¥ 7 '.¥ 7 ¦¥, ,È¥(¦2¥, ,È¥'. 7 ¦¥, ,È¥(Ç
  1  ¥.¦2¥, ,È¥'. 7 ¦¥, ,È¥(Ç  
Note that 
î,½,22  0 if ¥ <1 and î,½,22  0  if ¥ >1. Therefore, ÎÎ2 is unambiguously 
negative if ¥ <1. Using equation (3.72) one can use the results obtained so far to show 
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